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Source: Map courtesy of U.S. Bureau of Reclamation.

I. Introduction
The headwaters of the Klamath River draw from Upper Klamath Lake
and from a unique wetland complex in south-central Oregon and northern
California known as the Upper Klamath Basin.1 Along its 263-mile journey
from the Upper Basin to the Pacific Ocean, the Klamath River passes
through the Cascade and Coast Mountain Ranges, making it one of only

1.
Office of Energy Projects, Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, Final
Environmental Impact Statement for Relicensing of the Klamath Hydroelectric
Project No. 2082-027, at § 3.1 3-1 (Nov. 16, 2007), available at http://www.ferc.gov/
industries/hydropower/enviro/eis/2007/11-16-07.asp [hereinafter FERC FEIS].
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three river systems to bisect the Cascades.2 The native people of the
Klamath Basin have fished the river for thousands of years, depending on
historically massive migrations of chinook and coho salmon for their
subsistence.3 Before non-native inriver salmon harvesting began in 1876,4
the Klamath River supported the third-largest salmon runs in the United
States, with an estimated 880,000 returning adult fish per year.5 Over the
last century, however, major changes in hydrology, dam building, habitat
destruction, and disease have decimated the Klamath River salmon
population, reducing some runs to just 2 percent of their historic size and
fueling decades of bitter conflicts.6
In 2002, the plight of the Klamath River salmon became national news
when an estimated 79,000 adult chinook salmon died in the lower forty

2.
UNITED STATES GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, KLAMATH BASIN: A WATERSHED APPROACH
SUPPORT HABITAT RESTORATION, SPECIES RECOVERY, AND WATER RESOURCE PLANNING 1
(2007), available at http://wfrc.usgs.gov/pubs/factsheetpdf/kbawsafs080807.pdf;
Klamath Riverkeeper, The Klamath River Watershed, http://www.klamathriver.org/
watershed.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2009). The Klamath is unusual in that its
headwaters are not in the mountains. Because the Klamath River flows from the
broad, flat Upper Klamath Basin to two rugged mountain ranges it has been
described as a “river upside down.” Russ Rymer, Reuniting a River, NATIONAL
GEOGRAPHIC MAGAZINE, Dec., 2008, at 140; Steve Kadel, Navigating the Klamath, HERALD
AND NEWS, Feb. 18, 2008, available at http://www.heraldandnews.com/articles/
2008/02/22/watermarks/part%201/water5.txt. The Pitt River (a tributary of the
Sacramento River) and the Columbia River are the other two rivers that pass through
the Cascade Range. Id.
3.
SARAH A. KRUSE & ASTRID J. SCHOLZ, PRELIMINARY ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT OF
DAM REMOVAL: THE KLAMATH RIVER 2 (2006); INSTITUTE FOR FISHERIES RESOURCES, ESTIMATES
OF PRE-DEVELOPMENT KLAMATH RIVER SALMON RUN SIZE 2 (1998) [hereinafter INSTITUTE FOR
FISHERIES RESOURCES].
4.
PETER B. MOYLE, INLAND FISHES OF CALIFORNIA 258 (2002).
5.
INSTITUTE FOR FISHERIES RESOURCES, supra note 3, at 2 tbl. 2; MOYLE, supra
note 4, at 258 (estimating the historic fall run of chinook salmon at 500,000 fish).
The Columbia River and the Sacramento-San Joaquin River system supported the
largest and second-largest historic runs, respectively. INSTITUTE OF FISHERIES, supra
note 3, at 2 tbl. 2.
6.
Felicity Barringer, Pact Would Open River, Removing Four Dams, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 14, 2008; Adell Louise Amos, Hydropower Reform and the Impact of the Energy Policy
Act of 2005 on the Klamath Basin: Renewed Optimism or Same Old Song? 22 J. ENVTL. L. &
LITIG. 1 (2007) (detailing resource conflicts in the Klamath Basin and the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission relicensing process for the Klamath Hydroelectric
Process) [hereinafter Amos]; Glen Spain, Dams, Water Reforms, and Endangered Species in
the Klamath Basin, 22 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 49 (2007) (cataloguing resource conflicts in
the Klamath Basin) [hereinafter Spain]. Two recent films document resource
conflicts in the Klamath Basin. For a detailed portrayal of the political struggle
between downstream Tribal fireman and upstream irrigators see, BATTLE FOR THE
KLAMATH (Veriscope Production 2005). For a moving portrayal of the Yurok, Hoopa,
Karuk and Klamath Tribes’ battle against PacifiCorp and the Klamath Dams see,
UPSTREAM BATTLE (Preview Production 2008).
TO
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miles of the river.7 The die-off was one of the worst fish kills in U.S. history.8
For the tribal fishermen of the Lower Klamath whose ancestors lived in
harmony with the fish for thousands of years and for whom the fish are
sacred, the fish kill was devastating.9 For PacifiCorp, a private electric
company whose license to operate four hydroelectric dams on the Klamath
River would need to be renewed in two years, the national attention was bad
timing.10
The Federal Power Act (“FPA”) authorizes the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) to issue licenses for non-federal
hydropower projects like PacifiCorp’s Klamath Hydroelectric Project
(“KHP”).11 Advocates for fish passage have used two provisions of the FPA to
ensure that environmental costs are factored into the total cost of a dam:12
1) section 4(e) of the FPA requires that FERC accept license conditions
imposed by federal land management agencies,13 and 2) section 18 of the
FPA requires FERC to include in the license any conditions proscribed by
other agencies, such as fishways.14 Applications of sections 4(e) and 18 can
result in driving the cost of a hydroelectric project beyond the point of

7.
The California Department of Fish and Game (“CDFG”) originally
estimated the number to be 34,000 dead adult fish. CDFG later explained that their
original estimate was “very conservative” and underestimated the number of adult
fish by 45,000. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND GAME, SEPTEMBER 2002 KLAMATH
RIVER FISH-KILL: FINAL ANALYSIS OF CONTRIBUTING FACTORS AND IMPACTS 158 (2004).
Unfortunately, news reports relied on the earlier inaccurate figure. See Timothy Egan,
As Thousands of Salmon Die, Fight for River Erupts Again, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2002
(estimating the number to be between 10,000 and 30,000 adult fish); Rymer, supra
note 2, at 140 (estimating the number to be at least 30,000 adult fish). Later reports
relied on the revised figure. See BATTLE FOR THE KLAMATH, supra note 6 (estimating the
number to be 70,000 adult fish). The 2002 fish kill was not the Klamath Basin’s first.
See Carl Ullman, Adjudicating Water Rights While Addressing Broad Resource Issues: Fitting a
th
Round Peg into a Square Hole, American Bar Association, 28 Annual Water Law
Conference, at 1 (Manuscript 2010 on file with author). Smaller fish kills in Upper
Klamath Lake in 1995, 1996, and 1997 rescieved less attention because they did not
involve salmon. Id.
8.
See Rymer, supra note 2, at 140.
9.
See id.
10.
Id. PacifiCorp, Company Facts, http://www.pacificorp.com/Navigation/
Navigation3877.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2009) [hereinafter Company Facts].
11.
Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 791–825 (2006).
12.
See David H. Becker, The Challenges of Dam Removal: The History and Lessons of
the Condit Dam and the Potential Threats from the 2005 Federal Power Act Amendments, 36 ENVT.
L. 811, 814 (2006) [hereinafter Becker].
13.
16 U.S.C. § 797(e).
14.
Id. at § 811.
430
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profitability.15 To receive a FERC license, a private dam operator must also
comply with the Clean Water Act (“CWA”). Section 401 of the CWA requires
an applicant for any federal license for activity that could result in a
discharge to navigable waters to obtain certification of compliance with
state water quality standards from the state or states involved.16 The
certification process can serve as a functional state veto over a potential
FERC license for a project that cannot comply with state water quality
standards because FERC cannot issue a license without the state
certification.17
PacifiCorp’s license for the KHP includes four hydroelectric dams on
the mainstem of the Klamath River: Iron Gate, Copco 1, Copco 2, and J.C.
Boyle.18 None of the four dams provide adequate fish passage, and they
therefore block an estimated 570 stream-miles of historically productive
salmon habitat.19 With its license for the KHP set to expire on March 1,
2006,20 less than two years after the fish kill, PacifiCorp applied to FERC for a
renewal of its license on February 26, 2004.21 Acting under section 18 of the
FPA, the National Marine Fisheries Service (“NMFS”) and the Fish and
Wildlife Service (“FWS”) prescribed fish screens and fishways for all four
dams, to be financed by PacifiCorp.22 Even if PacifiCorp agreed to construct
volitional fish passage at an estimated cost of over $46 million each year for
the life of any new license,23 the states of Oregon and California were in a
position to deny water quality certification, blocking license renewal

15.
See Becker, supra note 12, at 814; see also Michael C. Blumm & Viki A. Nadol,
The Decline of the Hydropower Czar and the Rise of Agency Pluralism in Hydroelectric Licensing, 26
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 81, 130 (2001).
16.
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1).
17.
See Kevin Beaton et al., The 1998 Idaho Water Quality Symposium, 35 IDAHO L.
REV. 453, 545 (1999); see also Becker, supra note 12, at 822; Spain, supra note 6, at 110.
The CWA provides that “[n]o license or permit shall be granted until the certification
required by this section has been obtained or has been waived as provided in the
preceding sentence. No license or permit shall be granted if certification has been
denied by the State, interstate agency, or the Administrator, as the case may be.” 33
U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1).
18.
FERC FEIS, supra note 1, at xxxiii.
19.
Spain, supra note 6, at 102–3. The figure of 570 stream-miles of habitat
includes the mainstem of the Klamath River and its tributaries above the Iron Gate
Dam. Id.
20.
FERC FEIS, supra note 1, at xxxiii. PacifiCorp’s fifty-year license was
issued in 1956 and expired in 2006. The company is currently operating the Klamath
Hydroelectric Project under an annual license. Id.
21.
Id.
22.
FERC FEIS, supra note 1, § 2.3.1.3, 2-27.
23.
FERC FEIS, supra note 1, § 4.4, 4-4. This cost, FERC noted, exceeds the
value of the power likely to be generated by the dams during that time frame.
431
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altogether.24
On November 13, 2008, after four years of hearings, appeals, and
studies, the federal government, the states, and PacifiCorp signed an
“Agreement in Principle”25 (“AIP”) addressing a framework for removal of the
four major dams on the Klamath River, and promising to develop a final
agreement shortly.26 On September 30, 2009, PacifiCorp and twenty-nine
federal, state, tribal, county, environmental, irrigation, and fishing
organizations announced the Klamath Hydroelectric Settlement Agreement
(“KHSA”) outlining a plan for dam removal by 2020.27 If the parties follow
through with the KHSA framework, the result would be the largest dam
removal in history.28 On February 18, 2010, representatives from more than
fifty organizations signed both the KHSA and the Klamath Basin Restoration
Agreement (“KBRA”), a separate agreement on river restoration and water
allocation.29 Together, the KHSA and KBRA offer an unprecedented plan for
comprehensive river restoration.30 However, combining federal legislation
needed for the two very different agreements may threaten the goal of dam
removal by 2020.31 Additionally, preconditions on a final determination on
dam removal,32 along with uncertainties about funding,33 liability,34 and
potential litigation35 could also each frustrate achieving dam removal by

24.
See infra Part III.C.5.
25.
AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE (2008), http://www.doi.gov/news/08_News_
Releases/klamathaip.pdf [hereinafter AIP].
26.
News Release, U.S. Department of the Interior, Agreement in Principle
Marks First Critical Step on Presumptive Path to Remove Four Klamath River Dams
(Nov. 13, 2008), available at https://www.doi.gov/news/08_News_Releases/111308.html
[hereinafter DOI News Release].
27.
KLAMATH HYDROELECTRIC SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT (Feb. 18, 2010) [hereinafter
KHSA].
28.
DOI News Release, supra note 26; see also Felicity Barringer, Deal on Dams on
Klamath Advances, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2008 (quoting Steve Thompson, Regional
Director, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service as stating that removing the four dams would
be “one of the most amazing restoration projects in the world”).
29.
KLAMATH BASIN RESTORATION AGREEMENT FOR THE SUSTAINABILITY OF PUBLIC AND
TRUST RESOURCES AND AFFECTED COMMUNITIES (Feb. 18, 2010) [hereinafter KBRA].
PacifiCorp was not required to and did not sign the KBRA. See KHSA, supra note 27, §
2.2.
30.
See Barringer, supra note 28.
31.
See infra Part V.A.
32.
See infra Part V.B, D.
33.
See infra Part V.C.
34.
See infra Part V.E.
35.
See infra Part V.G; see Janine Robben, Navigating Water Law in Oregon, 69 Or.
St. B. Bull. 17, 20. “Some of the organizations that have been concerned about
Klamath Basin water for years, most notably some environmental groups, did not
sign off on it, which may result in collateral attacks.” Id.
432

West

Northwest, Vol. 16, No. 2, Summer 2010

2020.
This article examines the background, content, and viability of the
KHSA. Section II provides the legal context of the KHSA, explaining FERC
relicensing, sections 4(e) and 18 of the FPA, and 401 of the CWA. Section III
describes the KHP and PacifiCorp’s initial attempt to relicense the project.
Section IV analyzes each element of the KHSA, highlighting threats to the
goal of dam removal by 2020 and evaluating the public policy of the
agreement. Section V concludes that, despite the agreement’s flaws, unified
support for the KHSA represents the best hope for Klamath River salmon.

II. Agency Pluralism and Recognizing the Total Cost of a
Dam
In 1920, Congress passed the Federal Water Power Act (“FWPA”) to
streamline the federal process for regulating private hydroelectric projects.36
The FWPA established the Federal Power Commission (“FPC”) to license the
construction and operation of private hydroelectric projects.37 At the time,
Congress was not concerned about the environmental consequences of dam
construction, and the FWPA did not contain adequate protection for fish and
wildlife.38 For nearly sixty years, FPC licensed new dams with little to no
consideration of the facilities’ effects on the environment.39
Today, FERC is the federal agency responsible for licensing private
hydroelectric projects, and the FPA governs the FERC licensing process.40
The FPA grants FERC exclusive jurisdiction to issue licenses for hydroelectric
projects, but authorizes state and federal agencies to recommend license
conditions designed to protect natural resources.41 The courts have found
some of these conditioning authorities to be mandatory, thereby requiring

36.
The Federal Water Power Act is now named the Federal Power Act and is
codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 791–825 (2006). Max J. Mizejewski, FERC’s Abdication of
Jurisdiction over Hydroelectric Dams on Nonnavigable Rivers: A Potential Setback for
Comprehensive Stream Management, 27 ENVTL. L. 741, 746 (1997); see Escondido Mutual Water
Company v. La Jolla Band of Mission Indians, 466 U.S. 765, 773 (1984). “In 1920, Congress
passed the Federal Water Power Act in order to eliminate the inefficiency and
confusion caused by the ‘piecemeal, restrictive, negative approach’ to licensing
prevailing under prior law.” Id. (quoting First Iowa Hydro-Electric Cooperative v. FPC, 328
U.S. 152, 180 (1946)).
37.
See Blumm & Nadol, supra, note 15, at 86; 41 Stat. 1063, 1063 (current
version at 16 U.S.C. § 792 (2006)).
38.
See Blumm & Nadol, supra note 15, at 86–87.
39.
See Becker, supra note 12, at 821; Blumm & Nadol, supra note 15, at 86–87.
40.
See Blumm & Nadol, supra note 15, at 86–87 (discussing how
congressional amendments to the FWPA changed the name of FPC to FERC, and how
the FPA supplemented the FWPA in 1935).
41.
16 U.S.C. §§ 797(e), 803(a)(1), 803(j), 811 (2005); see Amos, supra note 6, at
5 (explaining agency recommendations in the FERC licensing process).
433
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FERC to include the conditions in its licenses.42 In several recent FERC
relicensing processes, these provisions have led to agreements on dam
removal.43 During relicensing of the KHP, federal agency prescriptions and
the potential denial of state water quality certification drove the parties to
plan for dam removal.44

A. Federal Agency Conditions and Prescriptions
Beginning with the Supreme Court’s decision in Escondido Mutual Water
Company v. La Jolla Band of Mission Indians,45 courts have interpreted sections
4(e) and 18 of the FPA to grant federal agencies mandatory conditioning
authority for a FERC license.46 Courts have also determined that section 10
of the FPA grants federal agencies non-mandatory conditioning authority to
provide FERC with non-binding recommendations.47 Part 1 of this section
explains the decisions interpreting sections 4(e), 18, and 10 of the FPA. Part
2 explains the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (“EPA”),48 which changed the
procedures a federal agency must follow to impose a condition on a FERC
license.49
1. Sections 4(e), 18, and 10 of the Federal Power Act
Section 4(e) of the FPA requires that a FERC license “shall be subject
to and contain such conditions as the Secretary of the department under
whose supervision such reservation falls shall deem necessary for the

42.
See infra Part II.A–B (discussing sections 4(e) and 18 of the FPA and
section 401 of the CWA and related case law).
43.
See Becker, supra note 12, at 814. “The FPA’s provisions that require FERC
to give equal consideration to fish and wildlife protection in its licensing decisions,
and to accept as mandatory other resource agencies’ license conditions, led directly
to the successful removal of the Edwards Dam and the agreement to remove the
Condit Dam.” Id. When decommissioning appears necessary, FERC favors
negotiated settlements. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, Policy Statement on
Hydropower Licensing Settlements 1, 116 FERC ¶ 61,270 (Sept. 21, 2006). But
ultimately, FERC asserts that it has authority to reject an application for relicense
and to unilaterally order the decommissioning of a project. Fed. Energy Regulatory
Comm’n, Policy Statement, Project Decommissioning at Relicensing 2–5, 69 FERC ¶
61,336 (Dec. 14, 1994). FERC has acted under this authority only once, unilaterally
ordering the decommissioning of the Edwards Dam, but because this case resulted
in a negotiated settlement, the policy has never been subject to challenge in court.
44.
See infra Part III.
45.
466 U.S. 765 (1984).
46.
See infra Part II.A.1.
47.
Id.
48.
Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 241, 119 Stat. 594 (2005).
49.
See infra Part II.A.2.
434
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adequate protection and utilization of such reservation.”50 The term
“reservations” includes national forests managed by the Secretary of
Agriculture and various lands managed by the Secretary of the Interior.51
FERC’s authority to reject 4(e) conditions was at issue in Escondido Mutual
Water Co. v. La Jolla Band of Mission Indians.52 Escondido involved an application
for a FERC relicense of a diversion dam on the San Luis Rey River in
California.53 Under section 4(e), the Secretary of the Interior prescribed
twelve conditions on the license to ensure water for the Indian Reservations,
protect water quality, and restore fish habitat.54 FERC rejected the
Secretary’s conditions and refused to include them in the license, and the
Department of the Interior, the La Jolla Band, and the licensee all sued.55 In
the first major blow to FERC’s exclusive authority to condition licenses, the
Supreme Court held that the plain language of section 4(e) required FERC to
accept the conditions.56 Escondido changed the institutional relationship
between the Department of Interior and FERC and established a significant
precedent that would be applied to other hydropower license conditioning
authorities over the next two decades.57
Section 18 of the FPA provides that FERC “shall require the
construction, maintenance, and operation by a licensee at its own
expense . . . such fishways as may be prescribed by the Secretary of the
Interior or the Secretary of Commerce. . .”58 In American Rivers v. FERC
50.
16 U.S.C. § 797(e).
51.
“The term ‘reservations,’ as used in the FPA, includes certain lands and
facilities under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Forest Service within Agriculture, and
various components of Interior (namely, FWS, the National Park Service, the Bureau
of Land Management, the Bureau of Reclamation, or the Bureau of Indian Affairs).”
Resource Agency Procedures for Conditions and Prescriptions in Hydropower
Licenses, 70 Fed. Reg. 69,804, 69,806 (Nov. 17, 2005).
52.
466 U.S. 765 (1984). For a complete discussion of Escondido, see Blumm &
Nadol, supra note 15, at 90–96.
53.
466 U.S. at 768. The dam was located on the La Jolla Indian Reservation
and diverted water into a canal that ran through the La Jolla, Rincon, and San
Pasqual Indian Reservations. Id.
54.
See generally Escondido Mut. Water Co. v. FERC, 692 F.2d 1223 (9th Cir. 1982),
rev’d in part & aff’d in part sub nom., Escondito Mut. Water Co. v. La Jolla Band of
Mission Indians, 466 U.S. 765 (1984).
55.
Id. at 1229.
56.
Escondido, 466 U.S. at 772; see Blumm & Nadol, supra note 15, at 95
(describing FERC’s pre-Escondido licensing authority as “almost unlimited”).
57.
See Blumm & Nadol, supra note 15, at 96 (discussing the importance of
Escondido to the later rulings in PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Washington Department of
Ecology 511 U.S. 700 (1994) and American Rivers v. FERC, 129 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 1997)).
Both cases and their importance to KHSA negotiations are discussed infra Parts
II.A.2, II.B.2.
58.
16 U.S.C. § 811. The term “fishway” has itself been subject to some
controversy. After FERC promulgated narrow definitions for the term in 1991 and
435
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(American Rivers II),59 federal agencies made multiple prescriptions under
section 18 for the relicensing of the Leaburg-Walterville Hydroelectric
Project on the McKenzie River in Oregon.60 In response, FERC adopted the
conditions which involved fish ladders and fish screens, but determined that
many of the other section 18 conditions did not constitute “fishway
prescriptions,” and therefore did not include them in the license.61 Citing
Escondido, the Ninth Circuit62 held that FERC “may not modify, reject, or
reclassify any prescriptions submitted by the Secretaries under color of
section 18.”63 American Rivers II was a significant precedent for the KHP
relicensing because it required FERC to include in any new license the
section 18 prescriptions developed by the NMFS and FWS.64
American Rivers II also addressed federal agency conditioning authority
under sections 10 (j) and 10(a) of the FPA. Section 10(j) requires FERC to
include conditions in all hydropower licenses that “adequately and equitably
protect, mitigate damages to, and enhance, fish and wildlife (including
related spawning grounds and habitat)” and that these conditions be based
on recommendations by the NMFS and FWS.65
To reject agency
recommendations under section 10(j), FERC must make findings that the
agencies’ recommended conditions are not consistent with the FPA, and
that FERC’s conditions will protect fish and wildlife.66 Section 10(a)(2)(B)
states that FERC “shall consider” state and federal agency recommendations
then again in 1992, Congress vacated FERC’s definitions and provided that any future
FERC definition of the term would require concurrence by the Secretary of the
Interior and the Secretary of Commerce. Pub. L. No. 102-486, § 1701(b), 106 Stat.
3008. Congress clarified that fishways shall provide for “the safe and timely upstream
and downstream passage of fish [and] shall be limited to physical structures,
facilities, or devices necessary to maintain all life stages of such fish, and project
operations and measures related to such structures, facilities, or devices which are
necessary to ensure the effectiveness of such structures, facilities, or devices for such
fish.” Id.; see Blumm & Nadol, supra note 15, at 109 (discussing the evolution of the
term “fishway”).
59.
American Rivers v. FERC, 201 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2000). To distinguish this
case from an earlier opinion in American Rivers v. FERC, 129 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 1997)
(discussed infra Part II.B.3), the Ninth Circuit opinion will be referred to as American
Rivers II, and the Second Circuit case will be referred to as American Rivers I. See
Blumm and Nadol, supra note 15, at 75n.17 and accompanying text.
60.
American Rivers, 201 F.3d at 1192.
61.
Id.
62.
Under the judicial review provisions of the FPA, challenges to FERC
rulings are not reviewed by the district court; rather they are brought in the circuit
court.
63.
201 F.3d at 1210.
64.
These prescriptions are discussed infra Part III.C.1. For a discussion of the
significance of American Rivers II see Blumm & Nadol, supra note 15, at 108–17.
65.
16 U.S.C. § 803(j)(1).
66.
Id. § 803(j)(2)(A)–(b); see Blumm & Nadol, supra note 15, at 110–11.
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for fish and wildlife, but does not require FERC to make findings to reject
the recommendations.67 In American Rivers II, state and federal agencies
submitted fifty-six recommendations for the Leaburg-Walterville license
under section 10(j).68 FERC reclassified twenty-one of the section 10(j)
recommendations as section 10(a) recommendations, did not include the
twenty-one recommendations in the license, and did not make findings
justifying the rejections.69
The Ninth Circuit distinguished
recommendations under section 10(j) from mandatory conditions under
section 4(e).70 The court determined that Congress granted FERC some
discretion in how to implement section 10(j), and that it could, after giving
them “due regard,” lawfully reject the recommendations.71
2. The 2005 Federal Power Act Amendments
The hydropower industry opposed the mandatory conditioning
authority affirmed in Escondido and American Rivers II because the
interpretations enabled agencies to require expensive conditions and
prescriptions based on agency science.72 Beginning in the mid-1980s, the
industry lobbied Congress to amend the FPA to make it more difficult for
federal agencies to impose mandatory conditions and prescriptions on
FERC licenses under sections 4(e) and 18.73 The industry’s efforts appeared
to pay off when Congress passed, and President George W. Bush signed, the
Energy Policy Act of 2005.74 In the EPA, Congress imposed cumbersome new
procedures controlling federal agency conditioning authority.75
Under the EPA, if a federal agency imposes a section 4(e) condition or
a section 18 prescription on a license, the applicant, or any party to the
licensing proceeding, may respond by proposing an alternative condition or
prescription.76 The federal agency that imposed the condition must then
accept the alternative condition if it will result in cost savings “while still
“provid[ing] for the adequate protection and utilization of the reservation”
(for section 4(e) conditions), or is “no less protective than the fishway

67.
16 U.S.C. § 803(a)(2)(B).
68.
American Rivers, 201 F.3d at 1192.
69.
Id.
70.
Id. at 1202.
71.
Id.
72.
See Spain, supra note 6, at 106; see Becker, supra note 12, at 850; see Amos,
supra note 6, at 10.
73.
See Becker, supra note 12, at 850–52, n.258 and accompanying text, n.259
and accompanying text (describing the industry’s lobbying efforts, two failed bills,
and the various versions of the 2005 Energy Policy Act).
74.
Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 241, 119 Stat. 594 (2005).
75.
See Becker, supra note 12, at 850–52.
76.
Energy Policy Act of 2005, U.S.C. § 241(c).
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initially prescribed” (for section 18 prescriptions).77 If the federal agency
determines the alternative conditions will not adequately protect the
resource or will be less protective and the agency continues to support its
original conditions, FERC can direct the conflict to its Dispute Resolution
Service (“DSR”).78 The DSR will then issue a “non-binding advisory” which
the federal agency “may accept” unless it determines the recommendation
will not “adequately protect” the resource.79 Under both the alternative
conditioning provision and the DSR provision of the EPA, it is the federal
agency that proposed the original condition - not FERC - that determines
whether an alternative condition would provide adequate protection.
Therefore, the alternative conditioning and DSR provisions of the EPA did
not overturn the mandatory agency conditioning authority affirmed in
Escondido and American Rivers II, although the EPA did add more steps to the
process of prescribing mandatory conditions.
In addition to the two processes described above, the EPA also allows
for “an agency trial-type hearing” to be conducted by a FERC Administrative
Law Judge.80 The trial-type hearing may be requested by the license
applicant or any party to the licensing proceeding that disputes an issue of
material fact related to the section 4(e) conditions or section 18
prescriptions.81 The hearings must provide for discovery and allow industry
the opportunity to cross-examine agency scientists.82 Immediately following
the passage of the EPA, the Departments of Interior, Agriculture, and
Commerce promulgated interim final rules83 that extended the right to
propose alternative conditions and to request a trial-type hearing to parties
in all future licensing proceedings, as well as to parties in pending
proceedings.84
A coalition of conservation groups brought a facial challenge to the
interim final rules in 2006,85 alleging two violations of the Administrative

77.
Id. See Becker, supra note 12, at 851.
78.
Energy Policy Act of 2005 § 241(c). FERC may refer the dispute if it
determines the condition “would be inconsistent with the purposes of this part, or
other applicable law.” Id.
79.
Id.
80.
Id. at § 241(a), (b).
81.
Id.
82.
Resource Agency Procedures for Conditions and Prescriptions in
Hydropower Licenses, 70 Fed. Reg. 69,804, 69,807 (Nov. 17, 2005). See Becker, supra
note 12, at 855.
83.
70 Fed. Reg. 69,804 (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 1 (Dep’t of Agriculture),
43 C.F.R. pt. 45 (Dep’t of the Interior), and 50 C.F.R. pt. 221 (Dep’t of Commerce)).
84.
Id. at 69,807.
85.
Am. Rivers v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, No. C05-2086P, 2006 WL 2841929 (D.
Wash. 2006); see Amos, supra note 6, at 20–23 (discussing the case). The plaintiffs
included American Rivers, Friends of the River, Idaho Rivers United, American
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Procedure Act (“APA”).86 The plaintiffs alleged that the three agencies failed
to provide notice and comment in violation of sections 553(b) and (c) of the
APA, and that the interim final rules had an impermissible retroactive effect
because the rules extended new rights to parties in pending proceedings.87
On the first claim, the reviewing court determined that the rules were
exempt from the APA’s notice and comment requirements because the rules
were procedural and interpretative, not substantive.88 On the second claim,
the court determined that applying the EPA to pending license proceedings
was not impermissibly retroactive’’’.89 The court’s holding made the new
procedural rights of the EPA applicable to pending FERC license
proceedings, including the KHP relicensing proceeding. As discussed below,
the KHP became the first full proceedings under the EPA.90

B. Section 401 of the Clean Water Act and the State’s Role
In Hydropower Licensing
The CWA requires states to set “comprehensive water quality
Whitewater, Trout Unlimited, and Upper Chattahoochee Riverkeeper Fund, Inc. Trial
Pleading at 1, Am. Rivers, 2006 WL 1176934.
86.
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706, 1305, 3105,
3344, 4301, 5335, 5362, 7521 (2006).
87.
Am. Rivers, No. C05-2086P, at 1.
88.
Id. at 8. Plaintiffs conceded that some of the interim final rules were
procedural or interpretive, but argued that five of the rules were substantive and
therefore were subject to the APA’s notice and comment requirements. Id. at 4. One
of the five rules that plaintiffs argued was substantive was the “the applicability
provision.” Id. at 5. The applicability provision states that “the rules are effective
immediately and apply to pending proceedings in which a final license has not been
issued.” Id. Plaintiffs argued that the EPA did not clearly provide that the new rights
be made available to pending license proceedings. See id. The court sided with the
defendants, determining that because Congress made the EPA “effective
immediately” and because the EPA would be “applicable to all license applicants”
that the applicability provision of the interim final rules was interpretative. Id.
89.
Am. Rivers, No. C05-2086P, at 15. The court applied the two-part test
established in Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994). The Landgraf test first
asks “whether Congress has expressly prescribed the statute’s proper reach.” Id. at
280. If the answer to this question is “yes,” retroactive application of the statute is
permissible. Id. When Congress has not expressly prescribed the reach of the
statute, the court must determine “whether it would impair rights a party possessed
when he acted, increase a party’s liability for past conduct, or impose new duties
with respect to transactions already completed.” Id. Under the first part of the
Landgraf test, the court determined that Congress did not expressly provide whether
the rights of the EPA would apply to pending license proceedings. Id. at 9. Under
step two of the Landgraf test, the court concluded that the EPA did not have an
impermissible retroactive effect on finalized conditions and prescriptions, new rights,
intervention decisions, settlements, or the ability to comment. Id. at 9–14.
90.
See Amos, supra note 6, at 26–29. The KHP relicensing process is discussed
infra Part III.C.
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standards” for interstate waters.91 States create water quality standards by
designating uses for specific water bodies and establishing water quality
criteria to protect those uses.92 The CWA requires states to enforce their
water quality standards, and one tool for doing so is provided in section 401
of the CWA.93 Section 401 requires that a state must first issue a water
quality certification before the federal government may approve an activity
that could result in a discharge to intrastate navigable waters.94 In its water
quality certification, the state must include any conditions on the license
needed to ensure that the project will meet effluent limitations, applicable
state laws, and “other limitations” needed to comply with water quality
standards.95 If a state believes that a project will not meet effluent
limitations, state laws, or other limitations even with license conditions, the
state must deny certification, and the project cannot go forward.96
In S.D. Warren Co. v. Maine Board of Environmental Protection,97 the Supreme
Court addressed the question of whether discharges from dams trigger the
need for state water quality certification.98 Warren, a paper company, sought
the renewal of its FERC license to operate five dams on the Presumpscot
River in Maine.99 The state of Maine issued a 401 certification for the license
on the condition that Warren would operate the dams to provide for a
minimum stream flow in the river below the dam and to allow passage for
migratory fish and eels.100 FERC included Maine’s conditions in its license,
and Warren sued, claiming the operation of its dams would not result in
“discharges” under the CWA, and therefore relicensing did not trigger the
need for state water quality certification.101 Writing for a unanimous Court,
Justice Scalia explained that the term “discharge” as used in section 401 was
broader than the phrase “discharge of a pollutant” used elsewhere in the
CWA.102 In lieu of a statutory definition of the term, Justice Scalia held that
the plain meaning of “discharge” included the water leaving a dam.103 The
Supreme Court’s interpretation of “discharge” in Warren is significant

91.
PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Washington Dept. of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 700
(1994) (citing § 303 of the CWA).
92.
Id. at 707 (citing § 309 of the CWA).
93.
33 U.S.C. § 1341 (1977).
94.
Id.
95.
33 U.S.C. § 1319(d).
96.
See id.
97.
547 U.S. 370 (2006).
98.
Id. at 387.
99.
Id. at 373.
100.
Id. at 375.
101.
Id.
102.
Id.
103.
Id. at 387.
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because it ensures that states have authority to protect water quality during
any FERC hydroelectric licensing that includes discharges from a dam.104
Once the requirement for state water quality certification is triggered,
states must ensure that “the activity” to be licensed will not violate water
quality standards.105 In PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Washington Department of
Ecology,106 the Supreme Court addressed a state’s authority to condition
aspects of a project beyond the discharge.107 PUD No. 1 involved a proposal
by the city of Tacoma and a utility district to build a hydroelectric project on
the Dosewallips River in Washington.108 Fearing the project would not leave
enough water in the river to support salmon and trout populations
(designated uses of the Dosewallips)109 the state of Washington included in
its water quality certification the condition that flows in the bypass reach be
about 30 percent greater than originally proposed.110 The Supreme Court
upheld the minimum stream flow requirements, explaining that the term
“water quality standards” as used in section 401 could include designated
uses or the criteria to protect those uses.111 The ruling is significant because
it broadened the scope of a state’s conditioning authority over FERC
hydropower licenses to protect either designated uses or numeric water
quality criteria, as well as to impose minimum stream flows on a FERC
license.112
One question remaining after the Supreme Court’s holding in PUD No.
1 was whether FERC retained ultimate authority to reject a state’s 401
conditions and issue a hydropower license without them.113 The Second

104.
See id.
105.
40 C.F.R. 121.2(1)(3) (2008).
106.
51 U.S. 700 (1994).
107.
Id. at 709.
108.
Id. The project called for diverting about 75 percent of the water into a
tunnel that would run alongside the river through a series of turbines. Only 25
percent of Dosewallips’ water would be released into the bypass reach. Id.
109.
Id. at 714.
110.
Id. at 709.
111.
Id. at 714. The court rejected the city’s argument that the state could only
condition aspects of the project that would threaten both a designated use and water
quality criteria. Id. at 714–15. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(4)(B) (2000). The court went on to
hold that the antidegradation policy of the CWA was also sufficient justification for
conditioning the minimum stream flows. PUD No. 1, 511 U.S. at 718–719. The
antidegradation policy of the CWA is designed to “fill the gaps” that may exist under
the traditional water quality standards by establishing a three tiered classification for
water bodies. See Craig N. Johnston, et al., Legal Protection of the Environment 191
n.7 (2007).
112.
See Blumm & Nadol, supra note 15, at 99; see Christopher Rycewicz & Dan
Mensher, Growing State Authority under the Clean Water Act, 22 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 57,
57 (2007).
113.
See Blumm & Nadol, supra note 15, at 100.
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Circuit addressed this question in American Rivers, Inc. v. FERC (American Rivers
I).114 In American Rivers I, three companies sought licenses for several
Vermont granted
hydroelectric projects in the state of Vermont.115
certification under eighteen conditions,116 but FERC, reversing a
longstanding policy to leave review of 401 conditions to state courts,117
unilaterally found three of the eighteen conditions to be beyond the scope
of the state’s authority under section 401 and issued the Tunbridge Mill
Corporation a license without the three conditions.118
The Second Circuit reviewed the CWA issues de novo, explaining that
FERC’s interpretation of section 401 was not entitled to deference because
the Environmental Protection Agency, not FERC, administered the CWA.119
The court then held that the plain meaning of section 401(d) was
“unequivocal” and provided “little room for FERC to argue” that it had
authority to reject a state’s conditions.120 The court cited Escondido,121 finding
the case a “strikingly analogous factual and legal scenario.”122 Escondido, the
court explained, determined that FERC lacked authority to reject conditions
offered by another governmental agency in the face of clear statutory

114.
129 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 1997).
115.
Id. at 102. The court focused its review on the license granted to the
Tunbridge Mill Corporation (“Tunbridge”) for a small hydroelectric facility on the First
Fork of the White River. Tunbridge had properly applied to Vermont’s Agency of
Natural Resources (“VANR”) for 401 certification and, after several discussions,
Tunbridge and VANR agreed on conditions to be included in the certification. Id.
116.
Id.
117.
See id.
118.
Id. The state of Vermont objected, but FERC denied rehearing, prompting
Vermont to appeal to the Second Circuit. Id. at 103.
119.
Id. at 107 (citing Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467
U.S. 837 (1984), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(d) (1972) (“Except as otherwise expressly provided
in this chapter, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency . . . shall
administer this chapter.”), West v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 1122 (1989) (agencies interpreting a
statute administered by another agency are not entitled to deference), Oregon Natural
Desert Assoc. v. Thomas, 940 F.Supp. 1534, (D.Or. 1996) (U.S. Forest Service is not
entitled to deference interpreting section 401 because EPA alone administers the
CWA).
120.
American Rivers, 129 F.3d at 107 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a) as providing
that “any certification provided under this section…shall become a condition of any
Federal license or permit subject to the provisions of this section.”). The court
narrowly interpreted the holding in Keating v. FERC, 97 F.2d 616 (D.C.Cir. 1991), a case
that affirmed FERC’s authority to review state 401 conditions. Keating involved the
licensing of a dam in California. The Second Circuit held that Keating simply involved
FERC’s authority to ensure that it had obtained a valid certificate from the state, and
that this inquiry extended only to whether or not the state had followed the proper
procedure required for issuing certification. 129 F.3d at 109.
121.
See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing Escondido).
122.
American Rivers, 129 F.3d at 109–11.
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language requiring the conditions be adopted.123 American Rivers I is
significant because it affirmed that the state’s role in shaping the outcome
of FERC licensing proceedings is mandatory and on par with federal agency
conditioning authorities under the FPA.124 Taken together, the decisions in
Warren, PUD No. 1, and American Rivers I solidify a broad authority for states to
protect water quality during FERC hydropower licensing by imposing
mandatory license conditions or by denying project certification.

III. Efficient Breach: Attempting to Relicense the Klamath
Hydroelectric Project
PacifiCorp is a private utility company that provides electricity to 1.7
million customers in Oregon, Washington, Idaho, Wyoming, Utah, and
California.125 From 2005 to 2008, PacifiCorp netted an average yearly profit
of $377 million.126 The Klamath Hydroelectric Project (“KHP”) makes up only
a small fraction of PacifiCorp’s energy portfolio, accounting for less than 2
percent of the company’s total generating capacity.127 This Part describes
the KHP, explains the environmental problems caused by the Klamath
dams, and analyzes how PacifiCorp’s attempt to relicense the KHP led to the
Klamath Hydroelectric Settlement Agreement.

A. The Effect of the Klamath Hydroelectric Project on Fish
and Water Quality
PacifiCorp’s license for the KHP includes eight dams and power
generating structures located in Oregon and California.128 The eight dams
and structures are: 1) East Side, 2) West Side, 3) Keno, 4) J.C. Boyle, 5)
Copco No. 1, 6) Copco No. 2, 7) Fall Creek, and 8) Iron Gate.129 The upstream
boundary of the KHP is marked by Link River Dam, which is owned by the
Bureau of Reclamation (“BOR”) and regulates the water level of Upper
Klamath Lake at the input canal for BOR’s Klamath Irrigation Project,

123.
Id.
124.
See Blumm & Nadol, supra note 15, at 106 (explaining the significance of
American Rivers I).
125.
Company Facts, supra note 10.
126.
United States Securities and Exchange Commission, Form 10-K,
PacifiCorp, at 41 (2008), available at http://www.pacificorp.com/File/File88145.pdf.
127.
FERC FEIS, supra note 1, § 1.2. “Capacity,” often measured in megawatts
(“MW”), is a term used to describe the amount of electricity that can be produced by
a generator under certain conditions. PacifiCorp’s total capacity refers to the amount
of electricity that can be generated by all of the company’s power plants. See
Company Facts, supra note 10.
128.
FERC FEIS, supra note 1, § 2.1.1. For a map of the Klamath Basin see infra
table 1.
129.
Id.
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located near the town of Klamath Falls, Oregon.130 PacifiCorp diverts water
from Link River Dam to two power generating structures: the East Side and
West Side developments, both located off the mainstem of the Klamath
River.131 Below Link River Dam on the mainstem of the Klamath River is
Keno Dam132 and the four major hydroelectric dams: J.C. Boyle, Copco No. 1,
Copco No. 2, and Iron Gate.133 In total, the KHP has an installed capacity of
169 MW.134 The actual output of the KHP, however, has averaged only about
half that - 81.94 MW - over the last fifty-year FERC license.135 For

130.
Id. at § 2.1.1.1. Because PacifiCorp does not own the federal Link River
Dam, it is not part of the KHP. However, until 2006, PacifiCorp operated Link River
Dam under a separate agreement with BOR, which allowed PacifiCorp some control
over releases from the dam in exchange for selling discounted power to BOR’s
Klamath Irrigation Project irrigators. Id. BOR finished construction on a new fish
ladder on Link River Dam in 2005 that should enable passage of suckers and
salmonids into Upper Klamath Lake from Link River. Id. The agreement between BOR
and PacifiCorp expired in 2006. Currently PacifiCorp operates Link River Dam under
an annual contract renewable at the parties’ discretion. Id. “In recent years, however,
PacifiCorp claims this operational flexibility has not been fully realized, as BOR has
specified releases from Link River dam in an attempt to comply with Biological
Opinions (BiOps) relating to two species of sucker in Upper Klamath Lake and coho
salmon in the lower Klamath River, all of which are listed as either endangered or
threatened under the Endangered Species Act.” Id. For a discussion of the impacts of
providing a “select group” of Klamath Irrigation Project irrigators with highly
subsidized power, see Spain, supra note 6, at 113–17.
131.
FERC FEIS, supra note 1, § 2.1.1.1. The authorized generating capacity for
the East Side and West Side powerhouses are 3.188 MW and 0.6 MW, respectively. Id.
A MW is a unit of power. One MW is a million watts per second.
132.
Keno Dam is the first KHP dam on the mainstem of the Klamath River,
located about twenty-two river miles below Link River Dam. Id. § 2.1.1.2. Keno Dam is
relatively small, only twenty-five feet tall, and does not contain any hydroelectric
facilities. Id. Keno Dam is significant, however, because it creates the Keno Reservoir,
a twenty-two mile impoundment on the Klamath River that provides water to 41
percent of the lands irrigated by the Klamath Irrigation Project and the Lower
Klamath Lake National Wildlife Refuge. Id. Article 55 of PacifiCorp’s license for the
KHP requires PacifiCorp to manage the Keno Dam under an agreement with BOR
that ensures certain water levels in the Keno Reservoir for BOR’s Klamath Irrigation
Project irrigators. Id.
133.
J.C. Boyle Dam is located ten river miles below Keno Dam and has a total
authorized capacity of 97.98 MW. Id. § 2.1.1.3. Below J.C. Boyle Dam are Copco No. 1
and Copco No. 2 Dams, with an authorized capacity of 20 MW and 27.0 MW,
respectively. Id. §§ 2.1.1.4, 2.1.1.5. The final dam located on the mainstem of the
Klamath River is Iron Gate Dam, with an authorized capacity of 18 MW. Id. The eighth
facility of the KHP is Fall Creek Dam, a small dam located on Fall Creek, a tributary to
the Iron Gate Reservoir. Id. § 2.1.1.6.
134.
Id.
135.
The KHP produces 716,820 megawatt-hours (“MWh”). A MWh is a unit of
energy. One MWh represents a million watts (“MW”) of power applied over the period
of an hour. The 716,820 megawatt-hours (“MWh”) of energy produced by the KHP is
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comparison, the average capacity for one of PacifiCorp’s coal, geothermal, or
natural gas plants is 571 MW,136 and the capacity of the Grand Coulee Dam
on the Columbia River is 6795 MW.137 The KHP accounts for only 1.8 percent
of PacifiCorp’s total generating capacity.138
For an adult salmon returning from the Pacific Ocean to spawn in the
Klamath River or one of its tributaries, Iron Gate Dam, located 196.8 miles
from the mouth of the Klamath River, represents an abrupt barrier. Iron
Gate Dam provides no fish passage, eliminating 570 stream-miles of
anadromous fish habitat above the dam.139 Above Iron Gate Dam, Copco
No. 1 and No. 2 dams also provide no fish passage.140 J. C. Boyle Dam is
equipped with structures that provide downstream fish passage through a
single, 24-inch diameter fish screen bypass pipe that releases twenty cubic
feet per second (“cfs”) of flow below the dam, and upstream fish passage by
a 569-foot long pool and weir fishway.141 These facilities, however, are used
only by resident fish, and the NMFS has determined the facilities are
inadequate for anadromous fish migration.142 Keno Dam provides limited
fish passage for some species, but the passage does not meet agency
criteria for federally listed Lost River and shortnosed suckers.143 The 570
river miles of historic salmon habitat blocked by the KHP and Link River
Dam reduce anadromous fish habitat in the Klamath River Basin by 75
percent.144
equivalent to 81.94 MW of power. Id. at xxxiii; see Spain, supra note 6, at 101 n.207 and
accompanying text.
136.
PacifiCorp, Thermal Generation, http://www.pacificorp.com/Navigation/
Navigation591.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2009); see Spain, supra note 6, at 101 n.208
and accompanying text.
137.
Bonneville Power Administration, 2007 BPA Facts, available at
http://www.bpa.gov/corporate/about_BPA/Facts/FactDocs/BPA_Facts_2007.pdf (last
visited Feb. 28, 2009).
138.
FERC FEIS, supra note 1, § 1.2.
139.
C.W. HUNTINGTON, ESTIMATES OF ANADROMOUS FISH RUNS ABOVE THE SITE OF IRON
GATE DAM 4 (2006) available at http://www.klamathbasincrisis.org/settlement/
documents/Huntington(2006)-FishEstimatesUpdate.pdf; see also FERC FEIS, supra
note 1, § 2.1.1.7; see also Spain, supra note 6, at 102–3.
140.
FERC FEIS, supra note 1, §§ 2.1.1.4, 2.1.1.5.
141.
Id.
142.
BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, 2002 BIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT 27 (2002).
143.
FERC FEIS, supra note 1, § 5.2.8. “At Keno Dam the existing fishway does
not meet current criteria to accomplish lamprey passage because corners and ladder
steps are not rounded. Resident lamprey ammocoetes (juveniles) already rear within
tributaries within the Project.” U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND NATIONAL MARINE
FISHERIES SERVICE MODIFIED PRESCRIPTIONS FOR FISHWAYS AND ALTERNATIVES ANALYSIS
PURSUANT TO SECTION 18 AND SECTION 33 OF THE FEDERAL POWER ACT FOR THE KLAMATH
HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT 25 (2007) (internal citation omitted).
144.
FERC Docket No. P-2082-027 avaialable at http://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/
search/fercgensearch.asp (select “Field Date,” enter “From” 12/4/2006, enter “To”
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In addition to the loss of habitat due to blocked passage, the Klamath
River dams contribute to several serious downstream water quality issues
that severely limit salmon populations.145 High water temperatures, low
dissolved-oxygen levels, high levels of ammonia, toxic algae blooms, and
high nutrient concentrations are all exacerbated by, if not directly caused by
the dams and their reservoirs.146 Of particular concern is one species of
blue-green algae known as Microcystis aeruginosa.147 Microcystis creates
microcystin, a potent toxin that causes serious liver damage in fish, wildlife,
and humans.148 Iron Gate, Copco, and Keno dams create reservoirs with
warm, stagnant water, ideal breeding conditions for Microcystis. As a result of
the artificial conditions, water samples taken from Iron Gate and Copco
reservoirs have shown some of the highest levels of Microcystis in the world.149
When water is released from behind the dams, the toxin washes into the
Klamath River where it bioaccumulates in fish, creating serious health risks
for ecosystems, fishermen, and consumers.150 Dam removal would drain the
reservoirs where Microcystis breeds and dramatically reduce, if not eliminate,
the threat to fish and people.151

B. The Klamath Hydroelectric Project Relicensing Process
In 2004, PacifiCorp applied to FERC for a relicense to operate the

12/4/2006, enter “Docket Number” P-2082, select submit, and scroll down to
“Comments of INSTITUTE FOR FISHERIES RESOURCES, Pacific Coast Federation of
Fishermen’s Associations (“PCFFA”) and others on DEIS under P-2082” [hereinafter
Fishermen’s Comments].
145.
See Spain, supra note 6, at 110–13.
146.
FERC FEIS § 3.3.2.1.1., 3-95.
147.
Id. § 3.3.2.1.2., 3-111.
148.
See Spain, supra note 6 at 111 (citing Maria G. Antoniou et al.,
Cyanotoxins: New Generation of Water Contaminants, 131 J. ENVTL. ENGINEERING 1239,
1239 (2005); S. Pichardo et al., Toxic Effects Produced by Microcystins From a Natural
Cyanobacterial Bloom and a Microcystis aeruginosa Isolated Strain on the Fish Cell
Lines RTG-2 and PLHC-1, 51 Archives of Envtl. Contamination & Toxicology 86, 86-87
(2006)).
149.
See Spain, supra note 6 at 112 (citing V.F. Magalhaes et al., Microcystins
(Cyanobacteria Hepatotoxins) Bioaccumulation in Fish and Crustaceans from
Sepetiba Bay (Brasil, R.J.), 42 Toxicon 289, 289-90 (2003)). Water samples taken in the
summer of 2006 from the Iron Gate and Copco reservoirs showed levels of Microcystis
aeruginosa that “exceeded the World Health Organization’s moderate-risk-exposure
standard by more than 3900 times” and that were “among the highest recorded in the
world.” Spain, supra note 5 at 111–12 (citing Memorandum from Jacob Kann of
Aquatic Ecosystem Sciences on Cyanobacteria Results from July 13th and 27th, 2006,
at 1 (Aug. 8, 2006); Memorandum from Jacob Kann of Aquatic Ecosystem Sciences on
Cyanobacteria Results from August 7th-8th, 2006, at 1 (Aug. 21, 2006)).
150.
Id.
151.
See id.
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KHP.152 After two years of study and consultation, in 2006, the FWS and the
NMFS filed comments, including recommended terms and conditions for
the KHP.153
Included in the comments were preliminary fishway
prescriptions under section 18 of the FPA154 and recommended conditions
under both sections 10(j) and 10(a) of the FPA.155
Although the
recommended conditions under sections 10(j) and 10(a) were not binding
on FERC,156 the recommendations were significant because they called for
extensive mitigation and monitoring of anadromous fish outside of the
project boundary (under section 10(j))157 and removal of the four lower dams
(under section 10(a)).158 Three days after NMFS’s filing, the Bureau of Land
Management (“BLM”) and BOR (Interior agencies) each filed section 4(e)
preliminary conditions that required PacifiCorp to construct streamflow
monitoring stations throughout the KHP and to guarantee levels of releases
from J.C. Boyle Dam.159
Moving quickly to take advantage of the decision in American Rivers v.
U.S. Department of the Interior, which extended the rights of the EPA to both
applicants and parties in pending license proceedings,160 PacifiCorp filed a
request for hearings on fourteen disputed issues of material fact regarding
both the section 4(e) conditions and the section 18 prescriptions.161
Simultaneously, PacifiCorp filed its own alternative prescriptions and
152.
See In re Klamath Hydroelectric Project, No. 2006-NMFS-0001 at 3 (NOAA
Fisheries Sept. 27, 2006), available at http://elibrary.fercwww.fws.gov/idmws/common/
opennat.asp?fileID=11146718yreka/P2082/20060927/2Klamath_DNO_Final.pdf
[hereinafter In Re Klamath]. FERC Responded by issuing a Notice of Application Ready
for Environmental Analysis, including a Request for Preliminary Prescriptions and
Conditions. See id.
153.
NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV. & U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., PRELIMINARY FISH
PRESCRIPTIONS C-5 (2006) [hereinafter COMMERCE PRELIMINARY FISH PRESCRIPTIONS],
available at http://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/common/opennat.asp?fileID=10985726.
154.
Id. Section 18 prescriptions are mandatory. See infra Part II.A.1.
155.
COMMERCE PRELIMINARY FISH PRESCRIPTIONS, supra note 153.
156.
See supra Part II.A.1; see American Rivers II, 201 F.3d at 1208-10 (holding that
recommended conditions under 10(j) are non-binding on FERC); see Blumm & Nadol,
supra note 15 at 114–6 (explaining interpretations of section 10 conditions).
157.
COMMERCE PRELIMINARY FISH PRESCRIPTIONS, supra note 161, app. B.
158.
Id. app. C.
159.
FWS filed their section 18 preliminary prescriptions along with BLM and
BOR’s section 4(e) preliminary conditions. FWS’s section 18 preliminary
prescriptions were identical to NMFS section 18 preliminary prescriptions because
the two agencies consulted with each other on the content of the prescriptions. See In
Re Klamath, at 4, n.2.
160.
See supra Part II.A.3.
161.
See Letter from Anne K. Dailey, Troutman Sanders LLP, to Magalie Roman
Salas, Sec’y, Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n (Apr. 28, 2006), available at http://
elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/common/opennat.asp?fileID=11016462. PacifiCorp filed less
than two months after the ruling in American Rivers v. U.S. Department of the Interior.
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conditions which called for more studies into anadromous fish habitat
above the dams and a plan to trap fish below the project, transport the fish
around the dams in trucks, and release the fish in the river above the dams
(“trap and haul”).162 PacifiCorp’s alternative conditions and prescriptions
would not require construction of fishways, and therefore would be
significantly cheaper to implement.163
After the first full hearing conducted under the 2005 EPA,
Administrative Law Judge Parlen McKenna ruled in favor of the agencies on
twelve of the fourteen issues of fact.164 Most significantly, the agencies
succeeded in showing that anadromous fish had historically lived above Iron
Gate Dam, and that allowing salmon access to the river above Iron Gate
Dam would benefit the depleted species.165 At the end of the hearing, the
agencies submitted modified section 4(e) conditions and section 18
prescriptions that were substantially similar to the preliminary conditions.166
The NMFS also reaffirmed the recommended condition to remove the four
lower dams under section 10.167
1. The ‘Real’ Value of the KHP after Modified Prescriptions
and Conditions
The NMFS and FWS jointly filed modified prescriptions for the KHP in
January 2007.168 After acknowledging that recommendations to remove the
dams under section 10 of the EPA were non-binding on FERC,169 the
agencies acted under section 18, imposing binding prescriptions for the
KHP170 as well as binding fishway prescriptions for the four major dams.171

162.
FERC FEIS, supra note 1, § 2.3.1.3. Id.
163.
See id.
164.
In re Klamath, No. 2006-NMFS-0001 at 6 (NOAA Fisheries Sept. 27, 2006).
165.
Id.
166.
FERC FEIS, supra note, 1, § 2.3.1.3, 2-27. “The modified prescriptions
include[d] revisions to downstream fishway prescriptions at Copco No. 1 tailraces,
spillway prescriptions at all project developments, and bypass/attraction flow
changes.” Id.
167.
See Letter from Rodney R. McInnis, NMFS, to Magalie Roman Salas, Sec’y,
Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n (Jan. 26, 2007).
168.
Id.
169.
See supra Part II.A.1. (discussing section 10 of the FPA).
170.
FERC FEIS, supra note 1, § 2.3.1.3, 2-27–29. The general prescriptions
called for PacifiCorp to, among other things: design and construct all fish screens
and fishways in a manner consistent with NMFS guidelines; keep all fishways in
proper order, clear of trash, sediment, logs, debris, and other material that would
hinder passage; develop post-construction monitoring and evaluation plans to
assess the effectiveness of all prescribed structures; and design each upstream fish
passage facility to pass migrants throughout a designed streamflow range. Id.
171.
Id. § 2.3.1.3, 2-27.
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The fishway prescriptions included new fish ladders at Iron Gate, Copco No.
1, and Copco No. 2; redesigned fish ladders at J.C. Boyle; new fish screens
and bypasses at all dams; tailrace barriers at Copco No. 1, Copco No. 2, and
J.C. Boyle; and spillway modifications for all four dams.172 The Interior
agencies filed modified conditions under section 4(e) of the FPA in January,
2007,173 requiring PacifiCorp to, among other things, release minimum flows
from J.C. Boyle dam during specific times throughout the year, maintain a
minimum level in the Keno Reservoir and establish new streamflow
monitoring stations at various sites throughout the KHP.174
In its Final Environmental Impact Statement, FERC weighed the costs
of the section 4(e) conditions and the section 18 prescriptions against the
benefits of energy generation at the KHP.175 Under the renewed license, the
KHP would generate an average of only 533,879 MWh of electricity annually down twenty-five percent from the annual average of 716,820 MWh.176 FERC
projected the annual value of the power generated by the KHP after
imposing the conditions and prescriptions to be about $25 million.177 After
complying with the mandatory conditions and prescriptions, FERC
estimated the total annual cost of operating the KHP to be over $46 million,
thus projecting the net annual loss to PacifiCorp of operating the KHP under
the new conditions and prescriptions to be more than $20 million.178 After
mitigating its environmental impacts, the KHP would no longer be
economically viable. The FPA’s mandatory federal conditioning authorities
thus forced the parties to plan for dam removal.
2. The Certifications That Never Were
PacifiCorp applied to the Oregon Department of Environmental
Quality (“DEQ”) and the California Water Resources Control Board (“WRCB”)
for state Section 401(c) certification in March 2006.179 Under the CWA, DEQ
and WRCB must deny 401(c) certification if the agencies determine the
172.
Id. § 2.3.1.3, tbl. 2-2.
173.
See id. § 2.3.1.4, 2-32.
174.
Id. § 2.3.1.4, tbls. 2-3, 2-4.
175.
Id. § 4.4, 4-4.
176.
Id.
177.
Id.
178.
Id.
179.
Id. § 2.3.1.1, 2-27. Because the KHP straddles the Oregon-California
border, the laws of both states applied to PacifiCorp’s attempt to relicense the
project. One result of the dams being in two states was that PacifiCorp needed to
obtain 401(c) certification from two states, requiring PacifiCorp to navigate two
dissimilar state administrative programs. One difference between Oregon and
California’s 401(c) programs is that 401(c) certification in California triggers the need
for the WRCB to analyze environmental impacts under CEQA. Cal. Pub. Res. Code §
21000 et seq.
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project will not meet effluent limitations, state laws, or other limitations.180
A state has one year to respond to an application for water quality
certification, and if a state fails to respond within one year of receiving the
application, the state waives the certification requirement.181
One month before the deadline for state action on the application,
neither Oregon nor California had certified the license.182 Anticipating a
denial of certification, PacifiCorp withdrew its applications from both states
on February 28, 2007, and resubmitted the applications that same day in
order to push back the deadline for certification one year.183 California and
Oregon made clear that the applications remained inadequate, and that
without additional data, each state would deny certification.184 Because
state water quality certification is mandatory,185 and because Oregon and
California took such strong stances on ensuring water quality, the Clean
Water Act played a significant role in encouraging the parties to reach the
AIP. Even if PacifiCorp backed out of the KHSA and agreed to construct fish
passage,186 the dams would remain in place and water quality would not
improve.187 Therefore, the Clean Water Act will continue to provide a critical
incentive for the parties to ultimately agree on dam removal.

180.
See infra Part II.B. Oregon DEQ and California WRCB list the Klamath as
water-quality limited under section 303(d) of the CWA for several pollutants in both
Oregon and California. Or. Department of Environmental Quality, Water Quality
Assessment Database, http://www.deq.state.or.us/wq/assessment/rpt0406/search.asp
(last visited Jan. 30, 2009) (choose “Klamath River” as water body and “All
Parameters” as parameter); Cal. Environmental Protection Agency, Board Approved
2006 Clean Water Act Section 303(d) List of Water Quality Limited Segments 7–13
(2006), available at http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/water_issues/programs/tmdl/docs/
303dlists2006/swrcb/ r1_final303dlist.pdf.
181.
33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1) (1977).
182.
FERC FEIS, supra note 1, § 2.3.1.1, 2-27.
183.
See Letter from Elizabeth Lawson, Cal. Water Res. Control Eng’r, State
Water Res. Control Bd., to Cory Scott, Project Manager, PacifiCorp Energy (Mar. 20,
2007),
available
at
http://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/common/opennat.
asp?fileID=11316001; see Spain, supra note 6, at 112 n.261 and accompanying text.
184.
Letter from Elizabeth Lawson, Water Res. Control Eng’r, Cal. Water Res.
Control Bd., to Cory Scott, Project Manager, PacifiCorp Energy 11 (Feb. 26, 2007),
available at http://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/common/opennat.asp?fileID=11289671; see
Spain, supra note 5, at 112 n.262 and accompanying text.
185.
See infra Part II.B.
186.
AIP, supra note 24, § III.
187.
See supra Part III.B.
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IV. Evaluating the Klamath Hydroelectric Settlement
Agreement
On November 13, 2008, the states and PacifiCorp signed an
“Agreement in Principal” addressing removal of the four major dams on the
Klamath River.188 Negotiated and signed by the Bush administration, the
AIP outlined a nonbinding framework for the decommissioning, transfer of
ownership, and removal of Iron Gate, Copco 1, Copco 2, and J.C. Boyle dams
by 2020.189 In addition to planning for dam removal, the AIP embraced the
proposed Klamath Basin Restoration Agreement (proposed KBRA),190 an
earlier agreement among Klamath stakeholders on water reallocation and
fisheries restoration.191
The AIP called for a final agreement on dam removal by June 30,
2009.192 On that date, after only six months in office, the Obama
administration announced that an agreement on dam removal was “within
reach” and extended the deadline to September 2009.193 On September 30,
2009, the parties to the AIP and forty-two stakeholder groups announced but did not sign - the public review draft of the Klamath Hydroelectric
Settlement Agreement (“KHSA”).194 The KHSA retained the basic structure
and timeline of the AIP and required that the KHSA be signed concurrently
with the KBRA.195 After another four months of negotiations, on January 7,
2010, the parties released updated public review drafts of both agreements
for the parties to consider and sign by February 2010.196 Finally, on February

188.
DOI News Release, supra note 26.
189.
AIP, supra note 25 at 2, 7. The AIP contemplated several dates for dam
removal, the latest being 2025. Id.
190.
Id. § IV.
191.
See KBRA, supra note 29.
192.
AIP, supra note 25, § II.B.i.
193.
News Release, U.S. Department of the Interior, Salazar: Klamath Basin
th
Agreement “Within Reach” (July 30 , 2009), available at http://www.doi.gov/news/
pressreleases/2009_06_30_releaseC.cfm.
194.
KHSA, supra note 27. News Release, U.S. Department of the Interior,
Secretary Salazar Announces Draft Agreement on Klamath Dam Removal Proposal
(September 30, 2009), available at http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/ 2009_09_30
_release.cfm.
195.
Compare AIP, supra note 25 with KHSA, supra note 27; KHSA, supra note 27 § 2.2.
196.
See Colin Miner, Reaching Consensus on the Klamath, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2010,
available at http://greeninc.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/01/11/reaching-consensus-on-theklamath/?scp=1&sq=Klamath&st=cse; SUMMARY, KLAMATH HYDROELECTRIC SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENT 1, Jan. 7, 2010. On January 19, the Klamath Tribe became the first party to
sign the two agreements. Associated Press, Klamath Tribes OK basin restoration agreement,
COUNTY
HERALD
(Jan.
20,
2010),
available
at
MONTEREY
http://www.montereyherald.com/state/ci_14233039. On January 28, the Karuk Tribal
Council voted unanimously to support the two agreements. Press Release, Karuk
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18, 2010, over fifty parties signed the two agreements in the Oregon Capitol
Rotunda in Salem.197
With 427 FERC hydroelectric licenses expiring in the next 20 years,198
the KHSA could represent an influential model for resolving future
relicensing disputes. Beyond the private hydroelectric project relicensing
process, Klamath dam removal, if successful, could open the door for
removing even larger federally owned dams.199 This Section analyzes the
major components of the KHSA, assessing the viability of dam removal by
2020 and evaluates the public policy underlying the agreement.

A. The Klamath Basin Restoration Agreement and
Combined Federal Legislation
About a year before the parties announced the AIP, on January 15,
2008, the Klamath Settlement Group (“KSG”) announced the proposed KBRA
on water allocation and fisheries restoration in the Klamath Basin.200 The
KSG included three of the parties to the AIP - the states of Oregon and
California and the federal government - but did not include PacifiCorp.201

Tribe, Karuk Tribe Formally Approves Klamath Restoration Agreements (Jan. 28,
2010), available at http://www.indybay.org/newsitems/2010/01/29/18636586.php.
197.
See KHSA, supra note 27; KBRA, supra note 29; News Release, U.S.
Department of the Interior, Secretary Salazar, Governors Kulongoski and
Schwarzenegger Announce Agreement on Klamath River Basin Restoration (Feb. 18,
2010), available at http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/2010_02_18_release.cfm. At
the signing Governor Schwarzenegger said, “It’s time to say hasta la vista to the dams
on the Klamath River.” See KRDV, Historic Klamath Basin water agreements signed
in Salem, http://kdrv.com/page/163064 (Feb. 18, 2010).
198.
FERC, COMPLETE LIST OF ISSUED LICENSES Column G (2009), available at,
http://www.ferc.gov/industries/hydropower/gen-info/licensing/app-new.asp.
199.
See Daniel Jack Chasan, How taking out dams splits environmental groups,
CROSSCUT (Nov. 3, 2009), available at http://www.oregonwild.org/about/pressroom/press-clips/how-taking-out-dams-splits-environmental-groups (explaining how
some environmental groups hope the KHSA might lead to removing four dams on
the lower Snake River) [hereinafter Chasan]. For a critique of the most recent
proposal for mitigating the impact of the Snake River dams on salmon see Michael
Blumm, Obama disappoints when it comes to salmon, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (Oct. 13, 2009),
available at http://www.hcn.org/wotr/obama-disappoints-when-it-comes-to-salmon.
200.
PROPOSED KLAMATH RIVER BASIN RESTORATION AGREEMENT FOR THE
SUSTAINABILITY OF PUBLIC AND TRUST RESOURCES AND AFFECTED COMMUNITIES (2008),
http://www.edsheets.com/Klamathdocs.html [hereinafter PROPOSED KBRA]. Press
Release, Klamath Settlement Group, Klamath Settlement Group Releases Proposed
Klamath Basin Restoration Agreement for Public Review (Jan. 15, 2008), available at
http://www.edsheets.com/Klamathdocs.html. [hereinafter KBRA Press Release]. 26
parties comprised the KSG and negotiated the terms of the KBRA over a two-year
period. Id.
201.
In addition to representatives from the U.S. Departments of Agriculture,
Commerce, and the Interior and Oregon and California’s natural resource
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The proposed KBRA attempted to reallocate and reduce water diverted for
upstream irrigation while improving in stream flow for anadromous fish.202
Anticipating an agreement like the AIP, the proposed KBRA called for a
separate “Hydropower Agreement” with PacifiCorp to remove the four major
Klamath River dams,203 and required that the proposed KBRA could only be
finalized in conjunction with a final agreement on dam removal.204 Ten
months after the KSG announced the proposed KBRA, the parties to the AIP
embraced the KBRA, agreeing that the KBRA and the final hydropower
agreement would be “indivisible parts of a unified approach to resolving
Klamath Basin issues in the broad public interest.”205 In the KHSA, the
parties went a step further and explicitly required that all parties except
PacifiCorp must execute the KHSA and KBRA concurrently.206 On February
18, 2010, over fifty parties signed the final KBRA, a sprawling, 172-page
agreement.207
The goals of the KBRA are to 1) restore and sustain fish populations
that can support robust ocean and river harvest opportunities; 2) establish
reliable water and power for agriculture, communities, and National Wildlife
Refuges; and 3) promote the sustainability of all Klamath Basin
communities, including mitigating the effects of dam removal.208 The KBRA
calls for a series of programs and assurances to be coordinated by the
Klamath Basin Coordinating Council (Council), a novel basin-wide
governance structure.209 Under the KBRA, the Council would oversee nearly
$1 billion in spending over the first ten years of implementation, with ninety
percent of the funds going to anadromous fisheries restoration and water

departments, the KSG included representatives from four tribes, three counties,
environmental groups, agricultural and fishing interests, and landowners from inside
and outside the Klamath Irrigation Project. Id.
202.
Id.
203.
See Proposed KBRA, supra note 200, at Part II; SUMMARY, PROPOSED KLAMATH
BASIN RESTORATION AGREEMENT 1 (Jan. 15, 2008), http://www.edsheets.com/
Klamathdocs.html [hereinafter PROPOSED KBRA SUMMARY].
204.
The proposed KBRA called for a final KBRA to be executed concurrently
with the Hydropower Agreement. PROPOSED KBRA, supra note 200, §§ 1.5, 8.4.1, 39.
205.
AIP, supra note 25, § IV.
206.
KHSA, supra note 27, § 2.2.
207.
KBRA, supra note 29. Including the table of contents and appendices, the
KBRA is 369-pages long.
208.
SUMMARY, KLAMATH BASIN RESTORATION AGREEMENT 1 (Jan. 7, 2010)
[hereinafter KBRA SUMMARY].
209.
KBRA, supra note 29, app. D-1. The KBRA itself makes it clear, however,
that this new “governance” structure will not supersede or change any existing
governmental authorities, serving more as an inter-Party coordination and planning
entity intended to help implement the KBRA’s many restoration programs. Id.
§.2.2.1.
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provisions.210 Of the nearly $1 billion, 60 percent would come from funds
already allocated to various programs in the Klamath Basin.211 The
remaining forty percent would require additional funds from the federal
government, but the parties to the KBRA estimate that this $400 million
over the next ten years would be less than the average amount of federal
money historically spent on federal disaster relief in the basin.212 In addition
to the restoration program, the KBRA calls for substantial changes to the
schedules, plans, and other provisions governing how irrigation water is
delivered to the Klamath Reclamation Project, upper Klamath Basin, and the
National Wildlife Refuges.213
Both the KBRA and KHSA depend on federal legislation.214 The KBRA
calls for federal legislation to, among other things, authorize the Secretary
to execute the agreement and provide or redirect $970 million in federal
appropriations over ten years.215 The KHSA calls for legislation to, among
other things, authorize the Secretary to designate a Dam Removal Entity
(“DRE”) to take title to the dams and take them down, require FERC to issue
PacifiCorp one-year temporary licenses for the KHP until transfer to the
DRE, authorize transfer of Keno Dam from PacifiCorp to Interior, and
immunize PacifiCorp from liability associated with dam removal after the
DRE takes title to the dams.216 Because legislation for both agreements will
be offered to Congress as one bill, dam removal cannot proceed
independently of the significant federal appropriations required by the
KBRA.217
Although a broad coalition of stakeholders signed the KBRA, the
agreement divided environmental groups.218 In March 2008, the Northcoast
210.
Id. app. C-2; KBRA SUMMARY, supra note 208, at 10.
211.
PROPOSED KBRA SUMMARY, supra note 200, at 10.
212.
For example, in 2006, federal disaster relief for the Klamath fisheries
collapse totaled $60.4 million. See Glen Spain, No River Left Behind, Why Every Salmon
River Is Important, http://www.pcffa.org/fn-jun08.htm (last visited April 22, 2009).
213.
KBRA, supra note 29, §§ 14–20. The KBRA also outlined a process to
develop Habitat Conservation Plans (“HCPs”) to assist non-federal parties in
complying with the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”). KBRA, supra note 29, § 22. See
also Ullman, supra note 7, at 8 (stating that the ESA provisions of the KBRA should
shift the regulatory framework in the Klamath Basin “from Section 7 and occasional
Biological Opinions, to more predictable Habitat Conservation Plans).
214.
KHSA, supra note 27, app. E.
215.
Id. KBRA, supra note 29, app. C-2.
216.
KHSA, supra note 27, app. E; see infra Parts V.E. (discussing the DRE and
immunity for PacifiCorp), V.D. (discussing Keno Dam).
217.
KHSA, supra note 27, § 2.1.1. The states are responsible for funding dam
removal. See infra Part IV.C.
218.
See Janine Robben, Navigating Water Law in Oregon, 69 OR. ST. B. BULL. 17, 20.
“Some of the organizations that have been concerned about Klamath Basin water for
years, most notably some environmental groups, did not sign off on it, which may
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Environmental Center (“NEC”)219 - a longtime champion of Klamath River
dam removal—announced it did not support the KBRA.220 Relying on two
commissioned studies,221 NEC concluded that the KBRA did not guarantee
adequate stream flows for fish.222 Supporters of the KBRA - including other
environmental organizations and fishermen’s groups223 - disagree, pointing
result in collateral attacks.” Id. See Chasan, supra note 209. Early opposition also
came from landowners and politicians in Siskiyou County, California, who objected
to provisions allowing tribal and agency biologists to design the fisheries restoration
program and argued that the council structure did not include a representative
population from the mid-Klamath Basin. Marcia Armstrong, Siskiyou County
Supervisor, Klamath River Dams – Agreement in Principal (“AIP”), Siskiyou County
Supervisors Weekly Column (Nov. 25, 2008), available at http://www.
klamathbasincrisis.org/MarciaArmstrong/KlamathDamsAIP112508.htm.
219.
The Northcoast Environmental Center is a non-profit organization based
in Arcata, California and was one of the twenty-six parties that announced the
proposed KBRA. PROPOSED KBRA, supra note 200, § 1. NEC’s mission is “to promote
understanding of the relations between people and the biosphere and to conserve,
protect and celebrate terrestrial, aquatic and marine ecosystems of northern
California and southern Oregon.” NEC, Our Mission, http://yournec.org/modules
.php?op=modload&name=PagEd&file=index&page_id=360 (last visited April 22, 2009).
220.
News Release, Northcoast Environmental Center, NEC Rejects Klamath
Agreement (March 3, 2008) available at http://humboldtherald.wordpress.com/
2008/03/03/nec-rejects-klamath-agreement-news-release/ [hereinafter NEC News
Release].
221.
GREG KAMMAN, INDEPENDENT MODEL REVIEW FOR KLAMATH SETTLEMENT
NEGOTIATIONS, KLAMATH INDEPENDENT REVIEW PROJECT (“KIRP”) (Nov. 2007); BILL TRUSH,
COMMENTARY ON THE KLAMATH RIVER SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT (Nov. 2007).
222.
See NEC News Release, supra note 220. The studies also concluded that
the KBRA provided quantitative guarantees of water for agriculture users, but
included no guarantees for stream flows for fish during dry years or during drier
months of average years. Id. NEC also quoted Thomas Hardy, author of Hydrology,
Ecology and the Fishes of the Klamath River Basin, as stating that under the KBRA,
agriculture will be “taking too much water from the system” in dry years. See id.
Models project the river will go well below 1,000 cubic feet per second (cfs) during
drier parts of the year under the KBRA. Id. “Flows that resulted in the 2002 fish kill,
which killed nearly 70,000 adult Chinook salmon, were between 600 and 700 cfs.” Id.
See also KLAMATH CONSERVATION PARTNERS, OUTLINE OF OBJECTIONS TO THE KLAMATH BASIN
RESTORATION AND HYDROELECTRIC SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS 1 (Jan. 10, 2010) (claiming
that “[t]he water balance, guaranteeing diversion of 330,000 acre-feet for irrigators,
has no scientific basis and will, in 40 percent of water years, leave too little water in
the Klamath River to meet the current Coho Salmon BiOp flow requirements. There
are no guaranteed flows for fish.”). However, the author of one of those NEC
commissioned studies, Dr. Kamman, and Dr. Hardy as well, have since changed their
views and both now support the KBRA flows as adequate for salmon recovery when
coupled with dam removal.
See http://www.klamathriverrestoration.org/index.
php/issues/fisheries.html.
223.
American Rivers, California Trout, Institute for Fisheries Resources,
Northern California/Nevada Council Federation of Fly Fishers, Pacific Coast
Federation of Fishermen’s Associations, Salmon River Restoration Council, and Trout
Unlimited all signed the KBRA. KBRA, supra note 29, at 2.
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to KBRA programs to limit water diversions,224 retire water uses,225 and
authorize the Secretary to make real-time water management decisions to
benefit fish.226 These provisions notwithstanding, in December 2009, NEC
and a small coalition of environmental groups withdrew their support for the
KHSA citing, among other things, the linkage between the KHSA and
KBRA.227 In addition to the lack of assurances on stream flows, the Klamath
Conservation Partners (“KCP”) argued that combining controversial
legislation and appropriations called for by the KBRA with legislation
needed for dam removal could derail the KHSA.228 As an alternative, the
KCP put forward alternative “clean and clear” dam removal legislation that
did not include ties to the KBRA.229
The KBRA-KHSA linkage highlights a major policy concern for future
dam removal projects. On the one hand, the KCP make a strong argument
that negotiations, agreements, and legislation needed for dam removal
should be separated from issues related to fisheries restoration (which is
expensive) and water allocation (which is extremely contentious). Why
complicate and jeopardize a plan for dam removal with additional parties
and controversies? On the other hand, dam removal provides a unique
opportunity for comprehensive river restoration because the key
governmental parties are each at the negotiating table and focused on the
issue. Further, to achieve the most environmental benefit as soon as
possible, dam removal should be followed by habitat restoration.230 Why not
then coordinate the two processes to ensure the most environmental benefit
in the shortest amount of time? Also, including stakeholders early in the
process may reduce the risk of collateral attacks down the road.231
Lessons from the Klamath will not help to fully answer these questions
for a decade, but the existence and content of the two agreements offer a
starting point. Notwithstanding objections from some environmental

224.
KBRA, supra note 29, § 20.2.2.
225.
Id. § 20.2.3.
226.
Id. § 20.3.3.
227.
KLAMATH CONSERVATION PARTNERS, GUIDANCE STATEMENT 1, (Dec. 15, 2009)
available at http://www.oregonwild.org/waters/klamath/a-vision-for-the-klamath-basin/
klamath-conservation-partners.
228.
Id. at 3.
229.
THE KLAMATH FACILITIES REMOVAL ACT 2010: AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE KHSA
(Dec. 15, 2009) available at http://www.oregonwild.org/waters/klamath/a-vision-for-theklamath-basin/klamath-conservation-partners.
230.
See WILLIAM R. LOWRY, DAM POLITICS: RESTORING AMERICA’S RIVERS 61–2 (2003)
(describing the benefits of dam removal and habitat restoration). For time-lapse
animation sequences depicting restoration of the Klamath River see American
Rivers, Envisioning a Restored Klamath River, http://www.americanrivers.org/ourwork/restoring-rivers/dams/projects/envisioning-a-restored-klamath.html (2010).
231.
See infra Part V.G.
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groups, the KBRA and KHSA achieved broad support from diverse
stakeholder groups.232 This consensus alone offers some credence for the
comprehensive river restoration approach. However, compromises in the
KBRA and KHSA drove some parties to reject both agreements, leaving
these stakeholders in a position to challenge permits, authorizations, and
legislation needed for dam removal.233
More troubling, controversy
surrounding the KBRA, including its price tag, looms as a major threat to
needed dam removal legislation and jeopardizes dam removal altogether.
In the end, the efficacy of the KBRA-KHSA package and the comprehensive
river restoration model will be measured by the success or failure of the
ultimate goal of the KHSA - dam removal by 2020.234 As explained below,
success is far from a sure thing.

B. How and When to Decide: Federal Studies and
Determination by 2012
The KHSA is not an agreement to remove the four Klamath dams.235
Instead, the agreement calls for further studies236 and environmental review
to inform a determination by the Secretary of the Interior (Secretary) on
whether or not to proceed with dam removal.237 Several conditions must be
met before the Secretary can reach his determination: 1) Congress must
adopt legislation;238 2) the Secretary and PacifiCorp must agree on transfer
of Keno Dam;239 3) the states must authorize funding for dam removal and
the parties must agree on a plan for excess costs;240 and 4) the Secretary
must identify a suitable dam removal entity (“DRE”).241 Further, the

232.
See KBRA, supra note 29, at 2.
233.
See infra Part V.G.
234.
KHSA, supra note 27, § 7.3.1.
235.
See id. § 3.1.
236.
In April 2009, Interior Secretary Ken Salazar approved $4 million in federal
stimulus funds to contract the studies called for by the AIP. See The Associated
Press, Stimulus Money Pays for Klamath Dam Removal Study, THE OREGONIAN, April 19,
2009, available at http://www.oregonlive.com/environment/index.ssf/2009/04/stimulus_
money_pays_for_klamat.html; American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009,
Pub. L. No. 111-5, 2009. The approval was significant because it allowed BOR to
contract the studies without waiting for congressional approval—as designed under
the AIP. Secretary Salazar’s use of the stimulus funds therefore increases the chances
that the studies will be complete in time for him to make the determination on dam
removal by March 31, 2012. Id. KHSA, supra note 27, § 3.2.5.A.
237.
KHSA, supra note 27, § 3.2.1.
238.
Id. § 3.3.4(A); see supra Part IV.A. (explaining the challenges of combining
legislation called for by the KBRA with legislation needed for dam removal).
239.
KHSA, supra note 27, § 3.3.4(B); see infra Part IV.D. (discussing Keno Dam).
240.
KHSA, supra note 27, § 3.3.4(C), (D); see infra Part IV.C. (discussing costs).
241.
KHSA, supra note 27, § 3.3.4(E); see infra part IV.E. (explaining the DRE).
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Secretary may not decide to proceed with dam removal unless he
determines that, “in his judgment,” dam removal will benefit salmon and be
in the public interest.
The Secretary is to use his “best efforts” to make a determination on
dam removal by March 31, 2012.242 If one of the several conditions243 is not
met by the deadline the Secretary cannot make his determination. In such
an event the parties must meet and consider modifications to the KHSA,
potentially delaying dam removal.244 If all the conditions have been met,
and the Secretary determines to proceed with dam removal, both Oregon
and California have a right to veto dam removal if, “in its discretion and
independent judgment,” a state believes “significant impacts” cannot be
avoided or that the costs of dam removal will exceed the budget.245
Delaying and conditioning the final determination on dam removal
was highly controversial.246 Strong advocates for dam removal decided to
oppose the KHSA, arguing that delaying a final determination on dam
removal until 2012 created a two-year window for PacifiCorp and other
parties to derail the KHSA.247 Further, if the Secretary determines not to
proceed with dam removal, opponents to the KHSA warn that PacifiCorp
may return to the FERC relicensing process with greater leverage to keep the
dams and seek other means to recover the costs of mandatory conditions.248
Moreover, because the Secretary only has control over two of the four
preconditions for his determination 249 the ultimate fate of the KHSA will
likely rest with Congress,250 the California public utility commissions, and
California voters.251
242.
Id. § 3.3.4. The KHSA retained the same deadline for a Secretarial
determination on dam removal as the AIP. AIP, supra note 25, § III.
243.
See infra notes 238–242.
244.
See KHSA, supra note 27, § 3.3.4.
245.
Id. § 8.11.1.C.
246.
See KLAMATH CONSERVATION PARTNERS, OUTLINE OF OBJECTIONS TO THE KBRA
AND KHSA (Dec. 15, 2009), available at http://www.oregonwild.org/waters/klamath/avision-for-the-klamath-basin/KBRA-KHSAObjections_11.09.pdf
(outlining
18
separate objections, three of which relate to the Secretary’s determination).
247.
KLAMATH CONSERVATION PARTNERS, GUIDANCE STATEMENT 3 (Dec. 15, 2009),
available at http://www.oregonwild.org/waters/klamath/a-vision-for-the-klamath-basin/
GuidanceonKHSA_12.18.09.pdf.
248.
Id.
249.
See infra notes 239 & 241.
250.
See infra Part IV.A. (explaining the need for Congress to support dam
removal legislation).
251.
See supra Part IV.C. (discussing the need for state PUCs and California
voters to approve dam removal funding). However, failure of the California voters to
quickly approve funding is not fatal to the Secretarial Determination, which can be
made nonetheless if estimates show that California’s back up funding will not be
needed or provided California can give satisfactory assurances that its portion of the
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C. Paying for Removal
The KHSA funds dam removal from two sources: surcharges on
PacifiCorp’s customers in Oregon and California (customer contribution);252
and the sale of general obligation bonds in California (bonds).253 The
customer contribution would raise $200 million by 2020, and would be
applied first.254 California’s sale of bonds would bridge the gap between the
$200 million customer contribution and the actual cost of facilities removal,
if these additional funds are necessary for removal, but shall not exceed
$250 million.255 The total $450 million dollars represent the total state
contribution (“state cost cap”) and no party is responsible for costs beyond
the state cost cap.256 The KHSA does not provide for additional funds if the
project goes over budget. Indeed, PacifiCorp and the federal government
are expressly shielded from any costs or liability for removal.257 Instead,
costs over budget require the parties to meet and indentify additional
funding, also potentially delaying dam removal.258
On February 17, 2009, the Oregon Senate approved a surcharge on the
Oregon ratepayers of Pacific Power, the Oregon subsidiary of PacifiCorp.259
The Oregon House of Representatives passed a similar bill on June 12,260 and
on July 14 Oregon Governor Ted Kulongowski signed Senate Bill 76 (SB 76)
into law.261 Under SB 76 and as structured by the KHSA,262 Oregon
funding will be available by the date of removal. See KHSA, supra note 27, § 3.3.4(1)
and (2).
252.
KHSA, supra note 27, § 4.1.1.
253.
Id. § 4.1.2.
254.
Id. § 4.1.1.C.
255.
Id. § 4.1.2.A.
256.
Id. §§ 2.1.4.D., 4.10.
257.
Id. § 2.1.1.E.i. (PacifiCorp); id. § 4.10 (federal government).
258.
Id. § 2.3. See id. § 8.11.1.D. (including failure by either PUC to approve the
surcharge in a list of “potential termination events” that would trigger meet and
confer procedures).
259.
Oregon Senate Bill 76, available at http://www.leg.state.or.us/bills_laws/; see
Matt Preusch and Ted Sickinger, Senate OKs Surcharge for Dam Removal, OREGONIAN, Feb
18, 2009, available at http://www.oregonlive.com/business/oregonian/index.ssf?/base/
business/1234934706182210.xml&coll=7 [hereinafter Preusch & Sickinger]. SB 76
passed by an 18-12 vote. The vote was largely along party lines, with local Senator
Jason Atkinson casting the lone Republic “yes” vote on SB 76. Id. Pacific Power is the
Oregon, Washington and California subsidiary of PacifiCorp. Company Facts, supra
note 10.
260.
See Matt Preusch, Klamath Dam Removal Bill Clears House, THE OREGONIAN,
June 13, 2009, available at http://www.oregonlive.com/environment/index.ssf/2009/
06/klamath_dam_removal_bill_passe.html.
261.
Press Release, Governor Ted Kulongowski, Governor signs bill supporting
the restoration of the Klamath River basin (July 14th, 2009), available at
http://governor.oregon.gov/Gov/P2009/press_071409.shtml.
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ratepayers would contribute the lion’s share of the customer contribution
($184 million of the $200 million)263 because far more PacifiCorp customers
live in Oregon than in California.264
SB 76 requires the Public Utility Commission of Oregon to adopt the
surcharge, thus securing a major portion of the initial funds needed for
removal.265 California’s share of the customer contribution depends on the
California Public Utilities Commission adopting a similar surcharge in that
state to raise a maximum of $16 million.266 If either agency fails to approve
the surcharge, the parties will meet to attempt to identify alternative
funding, possibly delaying dam removal.267
On November 4, 2009, the California legislature passed a
comprehensive water package that combined four policy bills and an $11.14
billion bond measure.268 The legislation authorized the $250 million
Klamath bond, subject to a statewide referendum, but required the Klamath
bond be included in the overall water bond referendum.269 Because the
$11.4 billion bond requires approval by the California voters, the success of
the Klamath bond is dependent on popular support for the entire bond
measure, titled The Safe, Clean, and Reliable Drinking Water Supply Act of
2010 (Water Supply Act).270 A referendum for the Water Supply Act is
scheduled for November 2010.271
Paying for dam removal under the KHSA could threaten the goal of
dam removal by 2020 because the California PUC must approve the

262.
Id. § 4.1.1.D.
263.
Under SB 76, the maximum amount of money generated from surcharges
is capped at $200 million. See Oregon Senate Bill 76, supra note 260. The Governor’s
office estimated that over a ten-year period the surcharge would be a rate increase of
1 percent for residential customers and 2 percent for an average business. If the
dams are not removed the money will either be refunded to the PacifiCorp customers
or “used for their benefit.” Id.
264.
See Preusch & Sickinger, supra note 270.
265.
See Oregon Senate Bill 76, supra note 270.
266.
KHSA, supra note 27, § 4.1.1.E.
267.
Id. § 3.3. The Public Utility Commission of Oregon and the California
Public Utilities Commission are independent agencies not bound by the KHSA. Id. §
4.8. However, the California PUC does not need any special legislative authority to
levy such a surcharge, and is unlikely to object.
268.
See Bettina Boxall, State Legislature approves comprehensive package to overhaul
water system, including an $11-billion bond, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2009 available at
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2009/11/state-legislature-approves-compre
hensive-package-to-overhaul-water-system-including-an-11-billion-bo.html.
269.
See 2009 COMPREHENSIVE WATER PACKAGE: SPECIAL SESSION POLICY BILLS AND
BOND SUMMARY, http://gov.ca.gov/issue/water-supply (last visited Jan. 24, 2010).
270.
See id.
271.
Id. But note that failure to approve the Water Supply Act may not be fatal
to dam removal. See supra note 247.
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surcharge and California voters must vote for the water bond.272 It should be
noted, however, that FERC, BOR, and private contractors estimated dam
removal would cost between $79.9 million and $102.4 million - a fraction of
the $450 million state cost cap called for by the KHSA.273 Even if both the
California bond and the customer contribution fail, the KHSA parties may
decide to proceed with dam removal, relying entirely on the $184 million
Oregon customer contribution. This lopsided budgeting could draw an
outcry from residents of southern Oregon, and because Oregon has the
power to veto the Secretary’s determination on removal,274 the parties
should do everything in their power to secure California’s contribution.
Even if approved, payment for dam removal under the KHSA raises
serious questions for the taxpayer. Because dam removal will be paid for not by
PacifiCorp, but by the citizens of southern Oregon and northern California over
the next ten years, the KHSA shifts the financial burden of dam removal from a
profitable corporation to its dependent customers.275 Like the surcharge, the
bond measure also shifts the financial burden of dam removal from PacifiCorp
to the taxpayer.276 But the local and regional benefits of dam removal may
justify the public expenditure. If the KHSA succeeds, and the dams are
removed, the citizens of southern Oregon and northern California will benefit
from a restored wild and scenic river, rebounding salmon fisheries, and the
fulfillment of tribal trust responsibilities. Additionally, the KHSA promises
removal of all four dams, which would greatly improve water quality in both
states.277 On balance, many residents may indeed see the surcharge and bond
measure as sound investments in the regional environment and economy.

D. What to Do With Keno Dam
As described above,278 Keno Dam is a small, non-hydropower dam on
the mainstem of the Klamath River, upstream from the four major dams. In
its application to relicense the KHP, PacifiCorp proposed to eliminate Keno
Dam from the KHP license, claiming that FERC did not have jurisdiction

272.
See KHSA, supra note 27, § 4.8.
273.
FERC FEIS, supra note 1, at 4-6, tbl. 4-4. The estimates are in 2006 dollars.
Id. G&G Associates produced a much lower estimate: $37.5 million. Id.
274.
See KHSA, supra note 27, § 8.11.1.C.; see infra Part V.B.
275.
See id. § 4.1.1. Further, the surcharge requires the dams to remain in place
for at least ten years, where they will continue to block critical fish habitat. See id.
276.
See Sheila Kuehl, Water Water Everywhere For: The Bond, CALIFORNIA PROGRESS
REPORT (Jan. 18, 2010) available at http://www.californiaprogressreport.com/
site/?q=node/7351.
277.
See infra Part III.B.II.
278.
See supra Part III.A.
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over Keno Dam because the dam has no power generation facilities.279
Environmental and fishermen’s groups objected to PacifiCorp’s omission of
Keno Dam from its application, describing the omission as a “ruse” to avoid
costly upgrades to fish passage.280 The groups argued that Keno Dam blocks
fish passage for salmonids and Pacific lamprey, alters sediment flows to
spawning beds, raises water temperatures, concentrates nutrients from
upriver, and provides a breeding ground for Microcystis aeruginosa.281 The
groups claimed that PacifiCorp benefited from Keno Dam, by using the
facility to enhance peak power production at J.C. Boyle Dam.282
Under the proposed KBRA, PacifiCorp would transfer title to Keno Dam
to BOR and compensate BOR for water quality issues associated with the
dam.283 The AIP, while also calling for transfer of Keno Dam from PacifiCorp
to the federal government, did not require PacifiCorp to compensate the
federal government for water quality problems.284 Rather than resolve the
fate of Keno Dam, the KHSA calls for a separate agreement on the transfer of
the dam from PacifiCorp to the federal government by June 1, 2011.285 To
inform negotiations on transfer, the Secretary and other parties will study
water quality, fish passage, and future operation of Keno Dam concurrently
with, but independent of, the studies of the four major dams.286
The parties’ failure to agree on the terms of transfer of Keno Dam prior
to execution of the KHSA is unfortunate for several reasons. Most seriously,
if PacifiCorp and the federal government fail to agree on transfer by March
31, 2012 (the deadline for the Secretarial determination), the Secretary
cannot proceed with dam removal and the entire KHSA will be in jeopardy.287

279.
FERC FEIS, supra note 1, § 2.2.1. PacifiCorp claimed that because the
Keno Dam has no power generation facilities, and because it does not significantly
benefit power generation at the four dams downstream, FERC did not have
jurisdiction over the facility. Id. at § 2.2.1.2.
280.
Id. FWS and NMFS recommended upgrading fish passage at the Keno
dam, at an annualized cost estimated at $1.98 million. Id. at tab 5-103.
281.
Fishermen’s Comments, supra note 144, § II.
282.
Id.
283.
PROPOSED KBRA, supra note 200, § 8.2.1. The proposed KBRA did not
specify what type of compensation PacifiCorp would be required to pay BOR, but the
compensation could include restoration projects to improve the water quality of
Keno Reservoir and releases from Keno Dam into the Klamath River.
284.
AIP, supra note 25, § VII(B). PacifiCorp was not a party to the KBRA, but
was a party to the AIP. See AIP, supra note 25. Id. The omission of the water quality
compensation provision from the AIP could be an indication of PacifiCorp’s
leveraging during the AIP negotiations.
285.
KHSA, supra note 27, § 7.5.2.
286.
Id. § 7.5.1; see infra part V.B. (discussing the need for further study to
inform the Secretary’s determination on dam removal).
287.
KHSA, supra note 27, § 7.5.2.
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Also, Keno Dam requires millions of dollars in environmental upgrades.288
By not requiring PacifiCorp to compensate BOR, the KHSA leaves open the
possibility that PacifiCorp will pass this financial burden to the federal
taxpayer. Because authorization for the Secretary to take title to Keno Dam
must be included in federal legislation needed for dam removal,289 federal
appropriations to upgrade Keno Dam could weaken congressional support
for dam removal. Finally, shifting environmental liability from a private dam
owner to the federal government is bad policy and bad precedent for future
dam removal projects.

E. The ‘DRE’ and PacifiCorp’s Transfer of Liability
Dam removal under the KHSA revolves around a novel concept:
Rather than requiring PacifiCorp to remove its dams, the KHSA directs
PacifiCorp to transfer each dam to a dam removal entity (“DRE”) for
removal.290 After PacifiCorp transfers a dam to the DRE, federal dam removal
legislation will expressly shield PacifiCorp from any liability associated with
dam removal, including release of hazardous substances.291 Once in
possession of a dam, the DRE is responsible for accepting funds, securing
permits, executing removal, and, in the event of damages during removal,
defending liability claims.292
As negotiated by the Bush Administration, the DRE was required to be
a non-federal entity.293 Insisting on a non-federal DRE raised doubts over
the parties’ ability to identify a private company willing and able to assume
liability for such a large, unique project and execute removal within the fixed
budget of the state cost cap. The requirements for the DRE changed under
the Obama Administration. Under the KHSA, the Secretary may designate
either the Department of the Interior or a non-federal entity as the DRE.294
Under both scenarios, the Secretary must designate the DRE before making
a determination on dam removal.295 If the Secretary designates a nonfederal DRE, the designation is subject to concurrence by the states.296 If the
Secretary designates Interior as the DRE, no concurrence by the states is

288.
Alone, upgrades to fish passage will cost about $2 million. FERC FEIS,
supra note 1, § 5.2.8.
289.
KHSA, supra note 27, app. E(K).
290.
Id. § 7.4.
291.
Id. app. E(L).
292.
Id. § 7.1.1. The DRE is also required to carry appropriate liability
insurance. Id. § 7.1.1(G).
293.
AIP, supra note 25, § VIII.
294.
KHSA, supra note 27, § 3.3.4(E).
295.
Id. see supra Part V.B.
296.
KHSA, supra note 27, § 3.3.4(E).
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required.297
Once designated, the DRE will establish a “definite plan” for paying for
and executing dam removal.298 Upon completion of the definite plan, the
parties will have sixty days to review the plan for consistency with the
KHSA.299 If no party finds the definite plan inconsistent with the KHSA or if
all objections are resolved, each party covenants not to sue any other party
and agrees not to oppose the DRE’s attempts to secure permits for
removal.300 Once the DRE has secured all permits and the Secretary has
reconfirmed that dam removal will cost less than the state cost cap, the DRE
may commence dam removal by the target date of January 1, 2020.301
From a public policy perspective, the DRE concept is troubling. By
providing for transfer of the facilities to the DRE before removal, and by
calling for legislation immunizing PacifiCorp after transfer, the KHSA frees
PacifiCorp from all future responsibility over the four dams before the dams
are actually removed.302 The dams will continue to block fish passage, the
parties will not know the total cost of completing the project, and the
environmental impacts of removal will still be uncertain, but PacifiCorp which has profited off the dams for over half a century - will be immune from
all issues related to the dams.303 It is not surprising that the Obama
Administration included the option of designating Interior as the DRE
because finding a suitable non-federal DRE might prove impossible based on
liability concerns. In all likelihood, Interior will be the dam removal entity.
One potential advantage of the DRE approach is that PacifiCorp would
not be responsible for securing permits for removal.304 Because the KHSA
allows PacifiCorp to continue to sell energy generated by the Klamath
dams,305 PacifiCorp would have an economic incentive to delay removal by
dragging out the permitting process.306 By transferring the duty to secure
necessary permits from PacifiCorp to the DRE, the KHSA increases the
likelihood that dam removal will be approved in a timely manner.

297.
Id.
298.
Id. § 7.2.
299.
Id. § 2.1.4(C).
300.
Id. § 2.1.4(C)(i–iii).
301.
Id. §§ 7.2.2, 7.3.1.
302.
See id. § 7.1.1.
303.
See id.
304.
See id. § 7.1.1.B.
305.
Id. § 7.3.3.
306.
See infra Part V.F. (discussing PacifiCorp’s difficulty securing permits to
remove Condit Dam).
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F. Interim Conditions
Because removal will not take place until 2020 at the earliest,307
mitigating environmental impacts of the Klamath dams over the next decade
will be critical to salmon. During the interim period,308 PacifiCorp will
operate the KHP under annual FERC licenses309 subject to interim
measures310 developed by PacifiCorp, FWS, and NMFS, and through Klamath
River Total Maximum Daily Loads (“TMDLs”),311 to be released by Oregon
DEQ and California WRCB before December 31, 2010.312 The interim
measures require PacifiCorp to, among other things, pay $510,000 a year to
fund salmon recovery efforts, vent turbines at Iron Gate Dam to improve
downstream dissolved oxygen levels, fund habitat improvement projects
within the KHP and pay $ 250,000 to fund research and pilot projects to
improve water quality.313 The TMDLs will regulate nutrients, sedimentation,
heat, and dissolved oxygen in the Klamath River.314 To comply with the
TMDLs, PacifiCorp must create a TMDL Implementation Plan in conjunction
with DEQ and California’s North Coast Regional Water Quality Control
Board (“NCRWQCB”).315
In addition to mandating better water quality while the parties work
toward dam removal under the KHSA, the TMDLs strengthen the KHSA in
another way. As explained above,316 for FERC to grant PacifiCorp a new
license for the dams, the states must certify that the KHP will not contribute

307.
KHSA, supra note 27,§ 7.3.1.
308.
The KHP defines “interim period” as “the period between the Effective
Date and Decommissioning.” Id. at § 1.4.
309.
Id. § 6.1.3.B.i.
310.
Id. § 6.1.
311.
Id. § 6.3. See NORTH COAST WATER RESOURCE CONTROL BOARD, STAFF REPORT
FOR THE KLAMATH RIVER TMDL’S (Dec. 2009), available at http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/
northcoast/water_issues/programs/tmdls/klamath_river/091223/Chapter_1_Introducti
on.pdf. [hereinafter TMDL REPORT]. Section 303(d) of the CWA requires states to
identify “impaired” water bodies that do not meet water quality standards. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1313(d)(1)(A). States must then develop total maximum daily loads of pollutants
that will result in the water body meeting water quality standards. Id. § 1313(d)(1)(C).
312.
In 1997, EPA entered into a consent decree with the Pacific Coast
Federation of Fishermen’s Associations that required EPA and WRCB to complete
TMDLs for seventeen northern California watersheds by 2007. Pacific Coast Federation of
Fishermen’s Associations et al. v. Marcus et al., No. 95-4474 MHP (N.D. Calif. 1997).
Plaintiffs and EPA agreed to extend the deadline to 2010. See TMDL REPORT, supra
note 322, at 1-3.
313.
Id. app. C, D.
314.
TMDL REPORT, supra note 312, tab. 1.2.
315.
Id. § 6.3.2.A.
316.
See infra Parts II.B, IV.B.2.
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to violations of state water quality standards.317 The Klamath TMDLs will
include strict criteria for dissolved oxygen and heat, two problems greatly
exacerbated by the dams.318 If the KHSA terminates and PacifiCorp seeks a
new FERC license, the TMDLs provide Oregon and California with solid
justification to deny water quality certification. With this heightened threat
of denial looming, PacifiCorp is more likely to follow through with dam
removal under the KHSA.319

G. Permits, Potential Litigation, and the Case of Condit
Dam
The DRE will obtain all necessary permits for dam removal, including
federal, state, and local permits.320 Under the KHSA, permits may result in a
termination321 of the agreement under three scenarios: 1) the DRE cannot
secure all the necessary permits for removal; 2) a permit is issued with a
condition that is inconsistent with the KHSA; or 3) litigation over a permit
results in a judgment inconsistent with the KHSA.322 If efforts to remove
Condit Dam on the White Salmon River in Washington are any indication,
permitting issues and litigation may further jeopardize Klamath Basin dam
removal by 2020.
Like the Klamath dams, Condit Dam is owned by PacifiCorp and blocks
miles of once highly productive salmon spawning habitat.323 Also like the
Klamath dams, during relicensing for Condit Dam federal agencies imposed
conditions and prescriptions under the FPA that made Condit Dam a net
financial loss for PacifiCorp.324
In 1999, PacifiCorp joined fifteen
environmental groups and five governmental agencies in a settlement

317.
33 U.S.C. § 1341.
318.
See infra Part III.A.; see also TMDL REPORT, supra note 312. See also David
Smith, Support, concern and questions expressed at TMDL workshop, SISKIYOU DAILY NEWS
(Jan. 29, 2010), available at http://www.siskiyoudaily.com/news/x1090828512/Supportconcern-and-questions-expressed-at-TMDL-workshop.
319.
Despite their strong legal hand, the state water boards would likely prefer
to avoid denying PacifiCorp 401 certification because PacifiCorp could respond with
a lawsuit costing the states years of legal fees. This reality creates an incentive for
the states to continue to press for dam removal under the KHSA. Another reason for
Oregon to continue to push for dam removal is that the water provisions in the KBRA
that promised to solve longstanding disputes require dam removal to become
effective. See Ullman, supra note 7, at 9.
320.
Id. § 7.2.1(C).
321.
Termination will occur only if a cure for the event is not reached after the
parties follow the “meet and confer” procedures. Id. §§ 8.11.1., 8.11.3.
322.
Id. §§ 8.11.1(G), (F).
323.
See Becker, supra note 12, at 813, 817.
324.
See id. at 825–27. “The section 18 prescriptions in FERC’s adopted
alternative doomed Condit Dam.” Id. at 826.
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agreement to remove Condit Dam.325 The settlement promised that
PacifiCorp would begin removal of the dam by 2006.326 PacifiCorp, however,
struggled to obtain water quality certification from Washington, local
permits from Skamania and Klickitat counties, and several federal permits
for removal.327 In 2005, responding to the permitting difficulties, the parties
to the settlement delayed the date for removal until 2008.328 In June 2009,
Washington released a schedule for environmental review to inform state
water quality certification, pushing the date for removal back to late 2010.329
It remains to be seen if Klickitat and Skamania counties will sue the state of
Washington over the certification, further delaying removal.330
The struggles to remove Condit Dam demonstrate that an agreement
on dam removal is only the first step in a complicated process requiring
approval from local, state, and federal agencies.331 If the Condit is finally
removed in late 2010 as currently planned, the permitting process will have
taken eleven years from the date the parties agreed on removal.332 Notably,
the 2020 target date for Klamath dam removal is also eleven years after the
parties on removal,333 perhaps indicating that the parties to the KHSA took
note of the slow pace of Condit permitting and planned accordingly. Still,
removing the four Klamath dams would be a much larger project than
removing Condit Dam, and the KHSA is a much more complex agreement

325.
Condit Hydroelectric Project Settlement Agreement, Condit Hydroelectric
Project, FERC No. P-2342-011 (Oct. 21, 1999), available at http://elibrary.ferc.gov/
idmws/nvcommon/NVViewer.asp?Doc=146919:0 [hereinafter Condit Settlement].
326.
Id. at 8.
327.
See Becker, supra note 12, at 833–43.
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than the Condit Settlement.334 In all likelihood, the time needed for
permitting could prove directly proportional to the size of the project. The
historic scale of the KHSA, while exciting for restoration advocates,
increases the chances that permitting or litigation could delay dam removal
for years beyond the 2020 goal.

V. Conclusion
Examination of the KHSA reveals a path to dam removal fraught with
potential setbacks. One delay could involve the adoption of federal
legislation,335 a process admittedly outside of the parties’ control.336 Another
is the potential difficulty in securing funding.337 Still another is the
controversy and high cost of the KBRA.338 Finally, parties outside of the
agreement could stall or derail the process through litigation.339 To be sure,
the target date for dam removal by 2020 may prove an optimistic one.
Yet the KHSA offers the best chance of dam removal on the Klamath
River and represents the greatest hope for Klamath salmon.340 By signing
the KHSA, PacifiCorp has agreed to - if not entirely pay for removal - at least
surrender its dams.341 And for the first time in the history of the Klamath
Basin, environmentalists and farmers, ranchers and fishermen, tribes, states,
and the federal government agree on the path ahead.342 As the parties to the
KHSA admit, dam removal by 2020 is not a guarantee and will require more
work and cooperation in the future.343 The KHSA is not perfect, but its flaws
can be mitigated if Klamath stakeholders rally behind it. It is indeed time to
“give change a chance”344 on the Klamath.
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